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ABSTRACT
Alexander Ludlow Cochran: The Second Front: The Struggle for PostColonial Power In French Indochina and Algeria
(Under the direction of Chiarella Esposito)
This thesis details events that occurred prior to, and during the French-Indochina War of
1946-1952 and the French-Algerian War of 1954-1962. In order to provide greater
historical context to my area of study, I extensively researched the history of each
nation in the 20*'^ Century. I utilized a variety of sources, including primary sources and
secondary sources. My method of research involved the taking of copious notes, and
synthesizing the information into a coherent argument and thesis. In the case studies of
both Indochina and Algeria, I will provide pertinent background information about
events leading up to the colonial war, events during the conflict and their ramifications.
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1

Following the conclusion of the Second World War in 1945, a prolonged period
of de-colonization commenced. The European powers that had amassed colonies.
protectorates and mandate territories lacked either the will or the resources necessary
to maintain the colonial empires and territories amassed during the preceding centuries.
While Belgium,the Netherlands and Great Britain were largely able to extricate
themselves from governance of their African and Asian colonies,the nation of France
found itself involved In two wars with indigenous independence movements In
Indochina and Algeria. During the period 1945-1962, France was incessantly waging war
against those colonial peoples who desired to attain their independence by force of
arms. The French-Indochina War lasted from 1946 until 1954, and ended with France's
Inglorious defeat at the Battle of Dien Bien Phu. Almost instantaneously after their
departure from Vietnam,the French found themselves embroiled in another colonial
conflict in Algeria. The French-Algerian War ended in 1962, with France successfully
negotiating a cessation of the conflict with the leaders of the Algerian independence
movement. Yet to describe these wars purely as those of a colonial power versus those
it had oppressed is to do a disservice to history. Within the story of each successful
revolution lies a more secretive and less easily decipherable tale of how the men who
led the independence movements rose to their positions of power following its end.
Those who suffered and bled in order to attain independence do not simply fade into
obscurity following the end of battle, like the esteemed CIncInnatus of ancient Roman
lore. Instead, they believe that their sacrifices merit more than honor and accolades:
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political power is what they ultimately desire. In this thesis, I will strive to outline and
explain how Ho Chi Minh and the Vietnamese Communists, and the Algerian National
Liberation Front came to inherit political power in their respective countries. Though
these movements were located on different continents and separated by thousands of
miles, the chronicle of their struggles for independence share many commonalities.
Both the Vietnamese Communists and the NLF strove to attain freedom and political
power, and they were not interested in the formation of governments in the traditional
western conception of rule. Instead, their leaders desired a monopoly on political
power that would not be diluted by the ideals of democracy. Thus, while engaged in
their struggle against the French, both entities were simultaneously involved in the
suppression of political rivals, whether they were individuals or parties. The NLF and the
Vietnamese Communists were able to attain their goal of political dominance by
controlling the revolutionary war efforts and by eradicating any and all indigenous
opposition during the course of their struggle to attain complete independence from
France.

3

For much of Vietnam's existence, its history has been the story of resistance and
occupation. The Mongols hordes,the Chinese, the French and later the Americans were
all considered invaders by the Vietnamese populace, especially among Its vast peasant
population, whose primary desire was to lead a peaceful existence.^ Its historical
Involvement with France was longer than that of the Algerians, who were invaded by
the French in 1830 in an attempt to distract the French public from domestic problems.
French Catholic missionaries had been evangelizing in Indochina since 1627, and it was
not until 1856 that the French government took an interest in this land.^ In 1856,
French Emperor Napoleon III authorized the invasion of Indochina in an attempt to
match England in the number of colonial possessions in Asia.^ In 1862,the French were
able to extort the three easternmost provinces of Cochin China as compensation for the
Vietnamese alleged persecution of missionaries.^ The southernmost portion of
Vietnam, Cochin China was subjugated in 1867, after defeating Chinese forces 1885,
France was also able to conquer Annam (Central Vietnam) and Tonkin,the
northernmost portion of the country.^ By 1887,the three sections of Vietnam were
Incorporated Into the French Union of Indochina, which also included Laos and
Cambodia.^ Though they were under French rule, the Vietnamese would prove to be a
difficult people to control.

^ James Pinckney Harrison, The Endless War:Fifty Years ofStruggle in Vietnam,(New York: The Free Press,
1982), 34-35.
^ Harrison, The Endless War,36.
^ Harrison, The Endless War,36.
'’Ellen J. Hammer, The Strugglefor Indochina (Stanford, CA:Stanford University Press, 1954), 58.
^ Harrison, The Endless War,36.
® Harrison, The Endless War,36.
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During the course of the 20*^ Century, Vietnamese nationalism evolved from a
simple hatred of foreign occupation into a constructive desire for Independence and
self-rule. The first source of inspiration to early Vietnamese nationalists was the
nationalist program of Sun-Yet-Sun,the Chinese leader who overthrew the Manchu
Dynasty in 1911 and who attempted to create a democratic government in China.^
While nationalism was a potent political ideology, it required a substantial support
structure that transcended social class distinctions in order to be wielded effectively.
The Viet Nam Quoc Dan Dang(VNQDD), which was more popularly known as the
Vietnamese Nationalist Party, was one such nationalist organization that failed to
coalesce anti-colonial opposition under its direction. Founded in 1927,the VNQDD was
only able to appeal to students and soldiers.® Though it was virulently anti-French and
anti-communist in its orientation, its disregard of Issues that were important to the
Vietnamese peasantry limited Its appeal on a national level.® Consequently, when
Vietnamese colonial troops affiliated with the VNQDD instigated an uprising in 1930,
they received little, if any support from the Vietnamese population near their base at
10

Yen Bay.

The result of this failed rebellion was the eradication of the VNQDD by the
11

French colonial authorities.

The utter failure of the VNQDD to initiate a revolt against the France was
indicative of the limited appeal of nationalism to the Vietnamese people. In the 1920's,
Vietnamese nationalism appealed strictly to the urban population, primarily students.
’Harrison, The Endless War,37.
® Hammer, The Strugglefor Indochina,S3.
® Harrison, The Endless War,48.
10
Hammer, The Endless War,83.
11
Hammer, The Endless War,83.
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teachers, clerks and the bourgeoisie.

This was also a period in which region loyalties

and the ties to one's family, village and clan superseded any allegiance to a Vietnamese
13

'nation' that did not exist.

Furthermore,the urban nationalists were unable to create

a distinct political ideology that would be readily received by Vietnamese of ail classes
14

and regions.

What Vietnam required was a nationalist organization that had mass

appeal, a highly centralized leadership structure and the patience required to wait for
the perfect opportunity to overthrow the French colonial authorities. The Vietnamese
Communists would prove to be the group that possessed such characteristics and
dedication.
The seminal figure of Vietnamese Communism was Ho Chi Minh, a man who was
known by many different names throughout his life. The name Ho Chi Minh means'He
who Enlightens'.^^ Born in 1890 as Ngyuen Sinh Cang, Ho was a determined man who
16

immigrated to France in 1917 and worked In Paris as a dishwasher.

At the time Paris

was home to a large number of Asian Nationalists, Socialists, and Communists from all
17

of France's Asian possessions.

Ho Chi Minh proved his dedication to the issue of

Vietnamese nationalism as early as 1919, when he attempted to act as the Vietnamese
18

people's representative at the Treaty of Versailles peace talks,

While there, he

attempted to present a petition for colonial self-determination to the representatives of

12

Duiker, The Communist Road to Power in Vietnam, 14.
Duiker, The Communist Road to Power in Vietnam, 13.
14
Duiker, The Communist Road to Power in Vietnam, 13.
15
Kevin Ruane, War and Revolution in Vietnam, 1930-1975 (London: UCL Press, 1988),!.
16
Harrison, The Endless War,37-38.
17
Harrison, The Endless War 3S.
18
Ruane, War and Revolution in Vietnam, 2.
13
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the Allied Powers.

Though Ho Chi Minh was unsuccessful in this maneuver, he was
20

instantly perceived as the face of nascent Vietnamese nationalism.

In 1920, Ho left

the French Socialist Party to join the newly-formed French Communist Party (PCF) due
21

to its belonging to the USSR's Comintern organization.

The PCF allowed colonial
22

dissidents and nationalists such as Ho Chi Minh to Join its ranks.

However,the French

Communists proved to be completely indifferent towards colonial issues due to their
23

primary focus on politics within France itself,

In due course, Ho's dedication to the

issue of independence for colonial peoples attracted the attention of Comintern officials
In Moscow, and In 1923 he was given a position at Comintern headquarters and was
accepted to the Stalin School for the Toilers of the East, a training school for promising
24

revolutionaries in Asia.

By 1924, Ho Chi Minh was stationed In Canton, China, serving
25

as a translator to the Comintern mission to the government of Sun-Yat-Sen.

It was in

Canton that Ho began the process of creating an official Communist Party for the
Vietnamese.
Ho Chi Minh adroitly recognized that the people of Vietnam were still in the
formative stage of political thought and action, primarily due to strict French censorship

19

William J. Duiker, The Communist Road to Power in Vietnam (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1981), 16.
Duiker, The Communist Road to Power in Vietnam, 16.
21
Ruane, \A/ar and Revolution in Vietnam, 2.
22
Herman Lebovics, True France: The Wars over Cultural Identity 1900-1945(Ithaca, NY: Cornell University
Press, 1992),98.
23
Lebovics, True France,99.
24
Duiker, The Communist Road to Power in Vietnam, 16.
25
Duiker, The Communist Road to Power in Vietnam, 17.
20
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laws regarding the importation of political tracts into their colonial possessions.

His

strategy of choice was,
The implications were clear: The Vietnamese people needed time to realize that social
revolution was the answer to their problems. In the meantime, a political party could
be formed to represent in embryonic form the ideas of Marx and Lenin and to appeal to
the population on the basis of the one issue that could elicit the most favorable
27
response-national liberation.
The desire to spread the gospel of Communism surreptitiously under the mantle of
Independence was the reason for the formation of the Vietnamese Revolutionary Youth
28

League.
29

area.

Its membership was comprised of Vietnamese expatriates from the Canton

Though on the surface the Revolutionary Youth League was a nationalist political

group that welcomed all Vietnamese striving for independence, it contained a secret cell
of Communists, whom Ho Chi Minh groomed to aid him in the creation of a Communist
30

Party.

Unfortunately, however,the League was forcibly disbanded by the Chinese
31

Kuomintang under Chiang Kai-Shek in 1927.

This setback, however, was but a mere

obstacle in the path to the creation of an Indigenous Communist Party In Indochina.
The decade of the 1930's featured both political gains and setbacks for the
Vietnamese Communists and Ho Chi Minh. In 1930, an Indochinese Communist Party
32

was created and incorporated into the Comintern organization,

This development.

however, meant that the ICP would be forced to take directions from the Comintern
leadership in Moscow, who were notorious for issuing orders to member organizations
26

Duiker, The Communist Road to Power in Vietnam, 17.
Duiker, The Communist Road to Power in Vietnam, 18.
28
Ruane, War and Revolution in Vietnam, 3.
29
Ruane, War and Revolution in Vietnam, 3.
30
Duiker, The Communist Road to Power in Vietnam, 18.
31
Ruane, War and Revolution in Vietnam, 3.
32
Ruane, War and Revolution in Vietnam,6.
27
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that were more compatible with Soviet Russian foreign policy than that of the interests
of individual countries or colonies.^^ Under the direction of Soviet leader Josef Stalin,
the Communist parties were instructed at the meeting of the Sixth Comintern Congress
to ingratiate themselves with workers and peasants as weli as to set up revolutionary
cells among the proletariat.^"^ This directive inspired the more radical Vietnamese
Communists to instigate peasant unrest in the Annamese provinces of Nghe An and Ha
35

Tinh.

The Communists exploited the ongoing famine in Nghe An and the peasant's

anger at high taxation rates in order to instigate a peasant rebellion in the spring of
36

1930.

This rural insurrection continued into 1931, and the French responded with the
37

brutal pacification of the rebeliious provinces.

The French also virtually eradicated the

Indochinese Communist Party: a conservative estimate shows that 2,000 Party members
38

were executed and 51,000 suspected militants were imprisoned,

Even Ho Chi Minh

could not escape the wide net cast by French authorities: he was detained in Hong Kong
39

by the British police.

If anything could be gleaned from the disastrous events of 1930,

it was evident that local unrest would not automatically result in a massive uprising
against the French colonial authorities. In order to gain wide support on a national
level, the Vietnamese Communists would need both to wait for a perfect opportunity to
present itself, as well as expand the scope of their activities, such as the formation of a
military wing of the party. Furthermore,the inherent fickleness of the rural peasantry
33

Duiker, The Communist Road to Power in
Duiker, The Communist Road to Power in
35
Harrison, The Endless War,53.
36
Duiker,
The Communist Road to Power in
37
Duiker,
The Communist Road to Power in
38
Duiker, The Communist Road to Power in
39
Duiker, The Communist Road to Power in
34

Vietnam,30.
Vietnam, 30.
Vietnam, 36-37.
Vietnam,40.
Vietnam,41.
Vietnam,41.
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proved that they could not be solely relied upon to serve as the foot soldiers of the
revolution; rather, a massive groundswell of popular support would be needed instead
for any insurrection to achieve success.
In retrospect,the disastrous failure of the 1930 peasant uprising actually
benefited the Vietnamese Communists in the long run. By 1935,the Comintern was
committed to the 'popular front' doctrine, which advocated Communist cooperation
40

Thus, when a Popular Front

with other political parties to combat the rise of fascism,

coalition headed by Socialist Leon Blum came into power in France In 1936,the
Indochinese Communist Party was recognized as a legal political entity and many of its
41

members still imprisoned were released via an amnesty.

By 1938, however,the

Popular Front coalition government had fallen from power,and the French colonial
42

government resumed its attempts to eradicate the ICP.

Those Vietnamese

Communists who had complied with the Comintern directive of collaboration were the
43

ones who suffered the most from reinstitution of French repression.

Historian Kevin

Ruane argues that this was a seminal moment in the history of Vietnamese
Communism,
It appears to have been the Comintern-trained members who bore the brunt of the
French onslaught,for they were never to be a force again. Significantly, their demise
ensured that those who would go on to rebuild and lead the party would be advocates,
like Ho, of the creative adaptation of Comintern injunctions to suit the social, economic
and political conditions peculiar to Vietnam, and by extension,the particular needs of
44
the Vietnamese revolution.

40

Ruane, War and Revolution in
Ruane, War and Revolution in
42
Ruane, War and Revolution in
43
Ruane, War and Revolution in
44
Ruane, War and Revolution in
41

Vietnam,6.
Vietnam, 7.
Vietnam,7.
Vietnam,7.
Vietnam,8.
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In essence,the Vietnamese Communists were no longer encumbered by their forced
adherence to the directives of the Comintern in Moscow, whose strategies did not
necessarily translate to predominantly agrarian countries such as Vietnam. Ho Chi Minh
and his fellow travelers were thus free to create a Communist Party that would be able
to appeal to Vietnamese peasants and workers, regardless of their regional or local
identities. The outbreak of the Second World War in 1939, and the events that occurred
during the war years would prove to be a formative period in the development and
history of Communism in Vietnam.
Unlike the majority of France's other colonial possessions, Vietnam was not
involved in the operations of World War II in the European theatre. Instead, its location
in South-East Asia meant that It would be impacted by the fighting between the
Japanese and the Allies in the Pacific theatre. The vast distance between France and
Indochina, as well as the danger of sea travel due to marauding German submarines
meant that the official French government,the Vichy Regime of Marshall Philippe
Petain, was denied the ability to directly administer the pre-eminent French colony in
Asia. Furthermore, Vietnam's physical location and proximity to China meant that the
effects of the Second Sino-Japanese War would have an Impact on Tonkin,the
northernmost French protectorate in the Indochina Union. During the Second World
War,the Vietnamese, French,Japanese, Chinese and Americans would all become
involved to some extent in the Internal political situation in Vietnam. The period of
World War II served as the crucible in which the different Indigenous Vietnamese

11

political movements would either forge a new identity for themselves or would dissipate
into irrelevancy.
Though metropolitan France had been defeated and occupied by the Germans in
the spring of 1940,the Second World War would not reach Vietnam until that autumn.
Negotiations had been taking place between the Vichy authorities in Indochina and the
Japanese, and by the early morning of September 22"^ a consensus had been reached by
45

both parties.

Though the agreement only stipulated that the Japanese could use the

port of Haiphong and that they could establish three air bases with corresponding
garrisons in Tonkin,the Japanese invaded from Southern China and landed on the
Tonkinese coast during the daytime on the 22"^.^® By September 25,1940, any and ail
French resistance to the invading Japanese forces had ceased.

Curiously enough,

however,the Japanese did not act in the same manner in Indochina as they did in the
colonial possessions of other European nations that they had overrun. By October 5,
1940,Japanese Emperor Hirohito declared that French sovereignty over Vietnam was
48

recognized by Imperial Japan and that the invasion had been an unfortunate error,

It

was far easier for Japan to co-opt the French Into administering the country on their
behalf, rather than to replace them with Japanese administrators during a time of war.
While the French still retained control of Indochina, the myth of the supremacy of the
49

white race over the Asians had been proved a hollow sham.

45

Ellen J. Hammer, The Strugglefor Indochina, 22
Hammer, The Strugglefor Indochina, 22.
47
Hammer, The Strugglefor Indochina, 22.
48
Hammer, The Strugglefor Indochina, 23.
49
Hammer, The Strugglefor Indochina, 23.

46

The swiftness with which

12

the French had been defeated by the forces of Japan had Immediate consequences for
the French authorities.
The ramifications of the French capitulation to the Japanese occurred almost
immediately. Shortly after the invasion began,the indigenous Vietnamese of the
mountainous Tonkinese provinces of Cao Bang and Lang Son began an armed
50

insurrection against the French.

This revolt, led by nationalist Tran Tung Lap was

defeated by late October; but other revolts occurred In Do Luong in Annam and at My
51

Tho in Cochin China.

While the revolts in Tonkin and Annam were easily quashed,the

rebellion at My Tho proved to be much more serious. Though the My Tho revolt ended
52

In November 1940, It required the French to utilize brutal methods in order to crush it.
The French forces deployed there brought the full arsenal of the French colonial army to
bear,"They brought in planes to bomb the Insurgents. Anyone who seemed suspicious,
//53

Unfortunately for the

they arrested. Anyone who tried to fight or flee, they shot.

French,these opportunistic Vietnamese uprisings were nothing compared to the threat
posed by the expansionist Thai state of Marshal Pibul Songgram, which demanded the
lost provinces^ on the right side of the Mekong River in French Laos and the French
54

Cambodian provinces of Battambang,Sisophon and Slemreap.

The territory the Thai's
55

sought to reclaim had been ceded to France during the 19 Century,

Songgram was a

militaristic leader who drew his Inspiration from the rapacity of Imperial Japan and
50

Hammer, The Strugglefor Indochina, 24.
Hammer, The Strugglefor Indochina, 24
52
Hammer, The Strugglefor Indochina, 25.
53
Hammer,
The Strugglefor Indochina, 25.
54
Hammer,
The Strugglefor Indochina, 25
55
David G. Marr, Vietnam 1945: The Questfor Power,{Berkeley/, CA: University of California Press, 1995),
22.
51
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believed that this was an opportune moment to expand his country's territorial
holdings, confident that the French colonial government would be unable to resist his
56

demands by force of arms.

The saber rattling of the Thais did not threaten the French

enough to appease Marshal Songgram, and this lead to undeclared warfare in early
1941. As hostilities erupted in January 1941,the French suffered an embarrassing
defeat in Cambodia on the 16**^.^^ This defeat took place during a counter-offensive
against the Thai forces and was the result of the Vietnamese colonial troops deserting
58

en masse rather than engaging in combat.

The crippling of the Siamese fleet at Koh

Chang by the numerically inferior French Fleet on January 17^^ resulted In the diplomatic
intervention of the Japanese, who also utilized their alliance with Nazi Germany to
induce the Vichy authorities in France to accept the Japanese proposed settlement to
59

end hostilities.

While France's colonial forces had achieved a victory in the strategic

sense, this was invalidated by the fact that it was Japan who orchestrated the cessation
of the hostilities, not the French themselves. Following the cessation of hostilities with
the Thai state, the Vichy French colonial authorities had much more to deal with than
trade negotiations with the Japanese over Vietnamese products.®® Japan was
advocating the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, which would ostensibly benefit
both Imperial Japan and all states or occupied colonial possessions in both Asia and in
the Pacific island chains. The French colonial administrators would have to act both
quickly and decisively in order to prevent Vietnam from joining that organization. They
56

Hammer, The Strugglefor Indochina, 25.
Hammer, The Strugglefor Indochina, 25
58
Marr, Vietnam 1945: The Questfor Power, 22.
59
Hammer,
The Strugglefor Indochina, 26.
60
Hammer, The Strugglefor Indochina, 28-29.
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would have to present the local Vietnamese elite with a viable political alternative to
the Japanese or face the loss of the crown jewel of France's Asian colonial possessions.
Under the leadership of Admiral Decoux,the French attempted to counter the
attractiveness of the Co-Prosperity Sphere by introducing the concept of an Indochinese
Federation, which would grant some autonomy to the Indochinese Union colonies of
61

Laos, Cambodia and Cochin China, as well as the protectorates of Annam and Tonkin.
62

The Indochinese federation would be both protected and advised by the French.

In

order to demonstrate the attractiveness of such an option,the French opened new
schools, commenced large public works projects, allowed for the teaching of the
Vietnamese language and encouraged the expatriate French elite to mingle with their
63

Vietnamese counterparts.

The entire Vietnamese population, however, did not

benefit from such measures. According to Ellen Hammer,Admiral Decoux's strategy
entailed,
Decoux pursued a deliberate policy of paternalism which made concessions only to a
small group of conservative and traditionalist natives-the so-called 'elite' and made
those concessions not to lessen French authority in the country, but to consolidate it.
The idea was to give the native elites more participation at the 'levels of direction and of
execution, even of authority,' but we,on the other hand found ourselves at the same
time obliged to reinforce and improve the organs of control, of command and of
security which more than ever had to be held firmly in French hands.®^
Decoux also prevented the Indochinese from making any Important administrative
65

decisions in order to avoid conceding any tangible authority to them,

Even the

governmental councils that were convened In 1941 and 1943 had their native members
61

Hammer, The Strugglefor Indochina, 31.
Hammer, The Strugglefor Indochina, 31.
63
Hammer, The Strugglefor Indochina, 31.
64
Hammer, The Strugglefor Indochina, 33.
65
Hammer, The Strugglefor Indochina, 33.
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directly appointed by the colonial administration, not elected by their brethren.

While

Admiral Decoux attempted to co-opt the affluent Saigon bourgeoisie by tantalizing them
with political participation, events were occurring in the very northernmost reaches of
Tonkin that would change the course of post-war Vietnam.
In 1941,eminent Vietnamese Communist leader Ho Chi Minh clandestinely re67

entered Vietnam from southern China.

Ho Chi Minh fervently believed that when

Japan was eventually defeated by the Allies, a moment of opportunity known as "thoi
co" would occur. In that a power vacuum would exist due to the minimal French
68

presence in Vietnam during World War II.

Irrespective of what kind of government

existed in France, it would take a considerable amount of time before the French could
muster a substantial military force to re-enter Vietnam. If a mass uprising by the
Vietnamese populace was to occur in the interim between the defeat of the Japanese
and the potential return of the French,the Vietnamese would have the opportunity to
69

create their own independent state.

Ho also believed that the anti-imperialist and

anti-colonialist sentiments of American President Franklin Roosevelt could deter a post70

war return to Vietnam by France,

In order for the Vietnamese people, and most

importantly,the Vietnamese Communists to seize the day if thoi co was to manifest
itself, they would need to create a considerable presence within Vietnam itself.

66

Hammer, The Strugglefor Indochina, 33.
Ruane, War and Revolution in Vietnam,8.
68
Ruane, War and Revolution in Vietnam,8.
69
Ruane, War and Revolution in Vietnam,8.
70
Hammer, The Strugglefor Indochina,42.
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Ho Chi Minh and the Vietnamese Communists began to take steps to establish a
71

base within Vietnam in early 1941.

Communist operative Phung Chi Kien was

dispatched in February 1941 to the Viet Bac region, on the border between China and
Tonkin to begin the formation of a guerrilla force that was labeled the National Salvation
72

Army.

At a May 1941 conference of the Vietnamese Communist leadership, it was

decided that the Socialist revolution would have to be temporarily subordinated to the
cause of national independence in order for them to win widespread support among the
73

Vietnamese populace.

An organization was established In order to allow the

Communists to do so,the Viet Nam Doc Lap Dung Minh (League for the Independence
74

of Vietnam), which was popularly known as the Vietminh.

The nascent independence

movement would be an umbrella organization, one that sought to incorporate all
75

patriotic organizations, irrespective of political status.

Though the Initial Vietminh

forces were small cadres of guerrillas, steps were taken to create local self-defense
militias in those villages that were under the leadership of the Vietminh.^® The initial
strategy employed was to establish a liberated zone In the Viet Bac, which would serve
as the locus of the revolution. From there,the movement and its foot soldiers would
77

expand their influence throughout all of Vietnam.

Inspired by Maoist doctrine. Ho Chi

Minh emphasized that In order for the movement to succeed,the Vietminh operatives

71

Duiker, The Communist Road to Power in Vietnam,67.
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would have to ingratiate themselves with the local peasantry.

By the end of 1941,the

Vietminh had a stable sphere of influence in the mountainous provinces of Bac Son and
Vu Nhai; additionally guerrillas in Cao Bang province were beginning to make inroads
79

among the peasants in the Red River Delta.

The eventual goal of attaining

independence was the paramount interest to the Vietminh during World War II, and
thus they avoided engaging in warfare against the Imperial Japanese and French forces
in order to develop their infrastructure and bring territories under their sway. This sage
strategy led to considerable progress,for as historian William Duiker wrote,"The year
1944 had seen considerable improvement in the Part/s fortunes in North Vietnam.
Vietminh control had spread throughout the entire area north of the Red River delta.
//80

The revolutionary armed forces were growing, and morale was high,

A surprising

development in 1945 would upset the established order in Vietnam, and many of the
forces that desired political dominance in Vietnam revealed themselves.
On the 9**^ of March, 1945,the Japanese suddenly occupied the French capital of
Saigon, seized all government buildings and arrested French officials, civilians and
81

troops.

Those few, isolated French garrisons that resisted the Japanese coup were

quickly defeated, and the survivors were summarily executed by the Japanese military
82

forces.

The few French troops able to escape the Japanese net fled to Northern

Tonkin and Upper Laos, where they were sheltered and created tentative alliances with
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the mountain tribes, notably the Moi, Meo, Man, and Thai.

Other Frenchmen, who

were able to flee, were aided by the VIetminh, who escorted them to safety in southern
84

China.

In fact, the Vietminh were surprisingly receptive to collaborating with the

French colonists in Indochina against the Japanese. As Ellen Hammer explains it.
Many times in the preceding four years the Vietminh had called upon the French to
work with it against the Japanese. But the French authorities had chosen to regard its
members as bandits, of which the Tonkinese countryside had seen many,and had
started a clean up drive against them bottling them up In the forests. Even as late as
March 1945 the Vietminh received no help from French officials.
While Ho Chi Minh and the Vietminh leaders began to formulate a strategy to deal with
the Japanese seizure of power, an important development had occurred in Annam.
Japan, in the last year of the Second World War,did not possess the resources
needed to govern Vietnam as an occupied province. The Japanese decided then,to
install a Vietnamese government that would be friendly towards Imperial Japan. Just
days after they had deposed the French colonial authorities, the hereditary Emperor of
86

Annam, Bao Dai, was installed as Emperor of Vietnam,

While he had retained the

respect afforded to the hereditary Emperor of Annam, Bao Dai lacked widespread
political appeal or even the smallest semblance of actual authority.*^ Though Bao Dai
was cognizant that he was a virtual 'puppet emperor', he still sought to win the support
88

of Vietnamese nationalists.
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Diem as his Prime Minister, but this move was discouraged by his Japanese overlords.
90

Instead the elderly scholar Tran Trong Kim was appointed in his place.

Bao Dai's

Cabinet was comprised of pragmatic men.
The men who joined his Cabinet had been trained in French schools and could hardly be
called anti-French; nevertheless they were all nationalists. They realized that Japan
might eventually be defeated but they had no idea that defeat was so close: in the
meantime they wanted to make the most of their new independence. Their hope was
to leave the country with a working nationalist regime that could survive
the Japanese
91
and meet the French and their allies as an independent government.
The newly founded government of Emperor Bao Dai was welcomed by a number of
nationalist political groups, notably the Dai Viet(National Party of Greater Viet Nam)
92

and the Phuc Quoc(Viet Nam Restoration League).

Had Bao Dai's government been

an organic creation, it would have presented a serious challenge to the burgeoning
Vietminh movement in the mountainous marches of Tonkin. The broad political
platform that had been implemented by Ho Chi Minh and the Communist leadership in
the hopes that Vietnamese of all social classes and political orientations would be drawn
to their organization would be nullified by an independent Vietnamese government.
However, among the majority of Vietnamese,the regime of Emperor Bao Dai was
viewed with suspicion due to Its Installation by the Japanese occupation forces and the
93

fact that Cochin China was being ruled by the Japanese.

This doubt as to the nature of

Bao Dai's authority was essentially confirmed by statements emanating from Tokyo that
the Japanese merely spoke of supporting Bao Dai's goal of obtaining independence for
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Vietnam; yet the Japanese forces did not acknowledge his authority outside of Annam.
Though the Japanese puppet government was doomed to failure, Japan's deposition of
the French won the Japanese the support of various groups that would become the
bitter opponents of the Vietminh and the Communists.
Among those that supported the Japanese after their deposition of the French
were the Hoa Hao and Cao Dai,two quasi-political religious sects that were popular in
95

southern Vietnam.

Like the Vietnamese Communists,these groups had been created

and gained Influence in the 20'*^ Century.^® The Cao Dai had been formally established in
Vietnam in 1926,though its founder Ngo Van Chieu claimed he had been visited by a
97

spirit named Cao Dai, or Supreme Being in 1919.

The Cao Dai faith was remarkably

complex, as it blended Taoism, Buddhism, Confucianism, Christianity and the belief of
98

the Vietnamese peasants in the spirit world,

The center of this faith was Tay NInh,

located northwest of Saigon and after Pham Cong Tac became the 'Pope" of the sect In
99

1935,the movement became Increasingly nationalistic,

The Cao Dai sect was

extremely popular among peasants, students, landowners and government officials, and
its rapid growth during the 20^^ Century resulted in the attempted suppression by the
100

French colonial authorities.

In response,the Cao Dal became supporters of the

Japanese, and after the Japanese had overthrown the French, Its members aided the
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Japanese in controlling Cochin China.

In actuality, the motivation of the Cao Dai sect

to support the Japanese stemmed from a series of predictions made by mystics of the
sect that supposedly foretold the fall of French colonial rule and a return to prosperity
102

for Vietnam with Japanese assistance.

Furthermore, as early as 1944,the Japanese

had begun to instruct rudimentary military training from members of the Imperial
103

Japanese Navy.

Prior to 1945, Provincial Cao Dai leaders had begun the process of
104

creating a Cao Dai militia, whose numbers soon grew to 30,000.

The Hoa Hao was

much smaller than the Cao Dai, owing to the fact that they had been founded shortly
before the outbreak of World War 11.^°^ This religious sect was immensely popular
among the rural peasantry, as it embraced an anti-colonial, egalitarian faith espousing a
reformist Buddhist doctrine.106 The Japanese had won the Hoa Hao's allegiance by
107

liberating their founder, Huynh Phu So from French captivity.

Both groups were anti-

Communist, and once the Japanese had been expelled from Indochina, the religious
sects continued their opposition to the Communists, who were seen as potential rivals
for the loyalty of rural Vietnamese peasants.
The French fall from power at the hands of the Japanese inspired the Vietminh
to action,for they believed that it would be easier to depose the Japanese then the
108

French.

101
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Liberation Committee and declared themselves to be the Provisional Revolutionary
109

Government.

The Vietminh's veteran guerrilla bands were consolidated into the

newly formed Vietnam National Liberation Army, which was commanded by Vo Nguyen
110

Giap, who would later become Vietnam's greatest military hero.

Furthermore,the

northern provinces of Cao Bang, Lang Son, Bac Kan, Ha Giang, Tuyen Quang, Bac Giang
and Thai Nguyen were consolidated into what was called the Liberated Zone in April,
111

1945.

Perhaps the most adroit move that Vietminh leadership did was to associate
112

itself with the Allied cause In the minds of the Vietnamese populace,

Not only would

it allow the Vietminh movement to partially share in the credit of the impending Allied
113

victory, but It also would afford them some credibility with the Allied powers.

The

Vietminh had tried to gain the support of the United States of America, primarily
because of the well known anti-colonial and anti-imperialist sentiments of President
114

Franklin Roosevelt.

According to Ellen Hammer,the Vietminh hoped that.

It offered the Allies co-operation In the war and asked in return that the great powers,
particularly the United States, give the Vietnamese military support and recognize their
eventual independence under the Atlantic Charter. Although no such recognition was
forthcoming, the Vietminh established friendly relations with the Americans in Kunming,
115
who began to supply it with arms.
Perhaps the Vietminh sought to gain American support because it was not considered to
be a colonial or imperialist nation, or maybe it was due to the fact that the U.S. had the
largest concentration of troops In the Pacific. The surrender of the Japanese to the
109
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Allied powers on August 15,1945 however, made it imperative that the Vietminh act
decisively so that they could attain power prior to a potential return of the French.
By early June of 1945,the Vietminh had commenced military operations in the
116

vicinity of the Chinese-Vietnamese border.

Although brigandage was rampant in the

Vietnamese countryside following the Japanese coup against the French colonial
authorities in March, reports from provincial governors had begun differentiating
117

between Viet Minh actions and those perpetrated by bandits.

In Cao Bang Province,

the Viet Minh had effectively destabilized the local authorities, who were only able to
118

communicate with each other if the Japanese military served as their messengers.
Additionally, the Viet Minh were attempting to kindle the embers of peasant unrest
throughout the northern provinces of Tonkin; they employed the slogan 'Seize paddy
stocks to save the people from starvation', an especially potent rallying cry given the
119

fact that famine was a common occurrence in Vietnam in 1945.

In Hanoi and other

cities in Tonkin, urban Viet Minh cadres took advantage of the cessation of French
restrictions on public assembly to organize a series of anti-Japanese demonstrations and
120

to disseminate pro-Viet Minh propaganda.

Also, in the provinces in the vicinity of
121

Hanoi, a shooting war had broken out between the Japanese and Viet Minh forces.
This was part of the Vietminh's strategy for the commencement of a general uprising in
the hopes of obtaining Independence. Their plan entailed the seizure of power in rural
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areas, which were more receptive to the Vietminh cause; the second step involved the
deployment of Viet Minh detachments in the countryside to the cities, where they
122

would link up with urban cadres to seize the cities.

The preparations for a general

uprising were far more intricate than merely rallying the Vietnamese populace to the
Viet Minh's cause and fighting a low Intensity conflict against the occupying Japanese
forces. What the Viet Minh, and by extension,the ICP leadership desired was the
creation of an independent country prior to a potential re-occupation of Vietnam by the
Allies.
During the summer of 1945,the Viet Bac area had begun to resemble an
autonomous state rather than a province devoid of the vestiges of governmental
authority. Giap's military forces had reached the level of 5,000 trained soldiers by May
123

1945 to both control and defend this "liberated zone".

It was also during this period

that the Vietnamese Communists within the Viet Minh began the organization of
124

Communist government at the local level.

People"s Revolutionary Committees were

organized at the local level to re-distribute communal lands and the property of French
colonialists and prominent Vietnamese landholders to the poorer inhabitants of the
125

region.

Though the provinces of northern Tonkin no longer were under the control of

the Japanese or responded to the authority of Bao Dal"s government,the Communists
lacked Internal cohesion in their attempts to institute local self rule that was compatible

122

Duiker, The Communist Road to Power in Vietnam,84.
Duiker, The Communist Road to Power in Vietnam,86.
124
Duiker, The Communist Road to Power in Vietnam,86.
125
Duiker, The Communist Road to Power in Vietnam,86-87.

123

25

with their ideals.126 The chaotic state that ensued was evocative of the spread of
Communist authority in Russia during the Russian Revolution. There was little or no
127

contact between the Communist leadership and that of the local cadres.

Local

leaders were essentially free to interpret the directives from their superiors as they saw
fit, which resulted in the highly disorganized chain of command that existed in the
128

'liberated zone' during the spring and summer of 1945.

The most significant

development of this period was the consolidation of authority by the Indochinese
Communist Party members in the Viet Minh at the expense of the non-communists
within the movement.129 A complete schism between the Communists and nonsympathizers within the Viet Minh had not yet occurred, however, because the
collective membership of the Viet Minh was still determined to effect the creation of an
independent Vietnam.
On the 15^*^ of August, 1945, news of the surrender of Japan was broadcast in the
130

city of Hanoi.

This development provoked the local Vietmlnh detachments to seize

the city's environs by nightfall on the

By August 19^^ the Vietminh had gained

control not only of Hanoi, but were attempting to expand their authority throughout the
rest of Indochina.132 Significant gains were made in Tonkin, an occurrence enabled by
an agreement made between the Vietminh and the Japanese that prevented
intervention by the occupying forces; this allowed the Vietminh to easily oust the
126
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virtually Impotent local Vietnamese officials from power.

The Vietminh issued a

Declaration of Independence on September 2"^*, 1945, and Ho Chi Minh began to act as
134

the political leader of Indochina.

This was perhaps an impetuous maneuver,for

internal political consensus had not yet been achieved, nor had the French given their
consent. The issue of who had attained political suzerainty in Indochina had not yet
been resolved, nor would it be for many years to come.
Though the Vietminh were the dominant political entity in Tonkin,they lacked
the Influence necessary to control both Annam and Cochin-China. In the provinces
south of the Cochin-Chinese city of Saigon,the Hoa Hao religious sect was particularly
dominant, and had refused to subordinate Its own goals to that of national
135

independence.

Following a September skirmish between the Hoa Hao and

Vietnamese Communists,the Hoa Hao unequivocally backed the French in their efforts
136

to restore colonial authority.

Additionally, the Cao Dai sect, which controlled the
137

delta region in southern Cochin-China, was known to be hostile to the Vietminh.

At

the same time however,the Vietnamese Communists were doing their utmost to
consolidate their grip on power in Hanoi. They even put aside their own political agenda
In an attempt to create a government Inclusive of the other Vietnamese nationalist
groups. After declaring independence,they began to implement plans to establish a
National Assembly by the end of 1945 and to establish people's councils at local
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governmental levels.

Ho Chi Minh and his advisers even went as far as to offer a role
139

in government to their rivals in the VNQDD and the Dong Minh Hoi.

The invitation to

the Dong Minh Hoi was particularly generous,for the Viet Nam Cach Menh Dong Minh
Hoi(Vietnamese Revolutionary League) had been created In 1942 as an explicitly anti140

Communist nationalist organization.

In their efforts to be Inclusive, the Vietnamese

Communists displayed their willingness to circumvent the democratic ideals they
professed to follow; regardless of the results of the future elections for the National
Assembly,the VNQDD was promised fifty seats, and the Dong Minh Hoi were
141

guaranteed twenty.

In addition, the Vietnamese Communists attempted to win the

support of the Vietnamese Roman Catholic population by creating a Vietminh sponsored
Catholic organization and by only instituting moderate economic policies rather than
142

radical ones.

At this juncture,the Vietnamese Communists were attempting to create

an ostensibly unified Vietnam with a quasi-democratic government. They were more
than willing to subordinate their own political ideology and goals in order to create a
functioning. Indigenous Vietnamese government as soon as possible. This was done in
the hope that the French would accept an independent Vietnam as a fait accompli, or
barring this, that France's allies, especially the United States, would pressure France Into
not intervening in the affairs of the new country. Thus,they were willing to Implement
a moderate economic program and include their political opponents in the formation of
a Vietnamese government. Delaying the implementation of socialism would not be a
138
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problem, considering the limitations of the political opposition. As William Duiker
argues.
But in Vietnam,the nationalists were unable to rise to the challenge. Plagued since the
early 1920's by factional and regional divisions, an inability(or an unwillingness)to build
a mass base in the countryside, and an absence of any overall sense of the Vietnamese
revolution, the urban bourgeois parties, variously moderate and radical, pro-Japanese,
pro-Chinese, or pro-French, were collectively almost inconsequential in the political
143
situation that foliowed the faii of Japan.
By forming what the Allied Powers would perceive to be an indigenous democracy, it
was the fervent hope of the Vietnamese Communists that they could avoid having to
fight against the French for independence. Confident in their abilities to win the
support of the Vietnamese peasantry with land reform,the Vietnamese Communists
mereiy had to pretend to be interested in sharing power with other political parties long
enough to cause the Allies to lose interest in Indochina. The plans of Ho Chi Minh and
the Indochinese Communist Party would soon be thwarted by the interference of
outside forces.
Concern over the potential post-war designs of United States and the Chinese
Nationalists on Indochina had prompted the French government to make the situation
144

Swift and decisive action was necessary

in Vietnam a top post World War II priority,

in order for the French to re-assert their authority. This desire to restore colonial rule
was abetted by the British Major General Sir Douglas Gracey, who acted in concert with
145

the French to expel the Vietminh from Saigon.

Beginning on September 22,1945,
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British troops, along with French troops recently released from Japanese internment
146

camps, moved to expel the Vietminh from Saigon and its surrounding suburbs.
Gracey even forcibly conscripted Japanese prisoners to aid in the effort, giving them the
147

option to either fight or face being accused of committing war crimes.

This action

paved the way for the return of the French armed forces, a contingent of whom landed
148

in Saigon in October.

Amidst the chaos caused by General Grace/s efforts to expel the Vietminh from
Saigon,the Vietnamese Communists initiated a clandestine assassination campaign in
the city itself. They systematically targeted and eliminated the small Vietnamese
Trotskyite faction in Saigon, as well as many urban nationalist and moderate political
leaders.149 This occurrence marked a departure from the employment of inclusive and
conciliatory political tactics by the Indochinese Communist Party. Though they still
appeared to be willing to share power with their political rivals, the very act of
employing such a strategy proves that this was nothing but a farce. Though the fighting
in Saigon in the fall of 1945 did not denote the beginning of war,this was still a very
drastic and unprompted course of action. Regardless of the unique circumstances of
this incident, it clearly indicates that the Vietnamese Communists never intended to
share any sort of political power with any other Vietnamese political faction. The
Indochinese Communists merely wished to lull their political rivals into a state of
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complacency, whereupon they could easily be eliminated and removed from whatever
role the non-Communists held in the nascent Vietnamese government.
French interests were also aided by the September 1945 invasion of Tonkin by
the Chinese Kuomintang, who had been tasked with accepting the surrender of the
150

Japanese troops in Vietnam north of the 16*^ Parallel.

The Kuomintang were not only

anti-communist, but had also brought with them Vietnamese nationalists opposed to
the Communist dominated Vietminh.151 Strangely enough,the actions of the Chinese
almost brought about a peaceful resolution to the issue of Vietnamese independence,
for their actions provoked Ho Chi Minh to begin negotiations with the French colonial
authorities. He was prompted to do so not only because the Chinese were a military
threat, but primarily because of the incessant looting and pillaging practiced by the
invaders.152 A conservative estimate mentioned by author James Harrison claims that
the Chinese extorted both money and goods in excess of 500 million Vietnamese
153

piasters from Tonkin alone.

Faced with the rapacious Chinese to the north, and the

French in the southern Vietnam, Ho Chi Minh began discussions with the French in the
hopes of maintaining the gains made by his acolytes in the summer of 1945. The talks
between Minh and French representative Jean Sainteny resulted In the March 6,1946
accords; the stipulated terms were that France would recognize an Independent
Republic of Vietnam, although It would remain a part of the Indochina Federation, and
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154

would also be incorporated into the French Union.

At this point. Ho Chi Minh favored

negotiation as a means of achieving independence by peaceful means; he also hoped
that the autumn 1946 elections in Metropolitan France would result in the election of a
leftist government; a development he hoped would make Vietnamese Independence a
:155

fait accompli.

In the midst of the negotiations between Ho Chi Minh and the French
government,the Vietnamese Communists spent the summer of 1946 waging a
campaign to destroy the VNQDD. They began by shutting down the VNQDD
headquarters in Hanoi and closing any newspapers In the city that supported their
156

political opponents.

The pro-VNQDD militias were also forcibly disbanded during this

157

period.

Following the flight to China to seek refuge of the VNQDD's remaining
158

leaders,their party effectively ceased to exist.

Though this was not a clandestine

action such as the assassination campaign waged against the opponents of the
Indochinese Communists in Saigon in 1945,the end result was the same. At this point,
there was no entity that could contend with the Vietnamese Communists for political
power among the Indochinese people. This was not a preemptive action begun in
anticipation of war with France; instead it was an elimination of an obstacle in the way
of the Communist's goal of political control of the Vietnamese. Ho Chi Minh and his
fellow travelers had merely paid lip service to the concept of a democratic government
in Vietnam In order to entice their opponents into participating rather than opposing
154
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the actions of the Vietnamese Communists. After this had been accomplished,the
political opposition to the ICP had outlived its usefulness. In their quest to win the
unconditional support of the Vietnamese people,the Communists could simply not
tolerate the existence of any entity that detracted from or challenged this aim.
Unfortunately for Ho Chi Minh and the Vietminh,the March 6**^ Accords were
undermined by the French virtually from their inception. While General LeClerc and
Jean Sainteny had striven to reach an agreement with the Vietminh leadership, their
159

efforts did not represent a consensus opinion among the French,

The superior of

both LeClerc and Sainteny, French High Commissioner Admiral Georges D'Argenlieu
virtually negated the agreement by refusing to apply its terms to Cochin-China, and by
160

designating the southern highlands as an 'autonomous region'.

Alexander Harrison

described how French public opinion was also not amiable towards an independent
Vietnam, arguing that.
Indeed it seems clear that the conservative French bureaucrats, who believed that the
grandeur and glory of France were as tied to the fate of their empire in 1946 as in 1896,
and the colons, especially of Saigon, who wished to guard at whatever cost the
privileges and charms of colonial life, must bear the primary responsibility for the failure
of the March 6 accords.^®^
The negotiations that continued in France from the spring to the fall were hopelessly
deadlocked because the French adamantly refused to make any concessions beyond
162

those made on March 6,1946.

Throughout this period, tensions escalated between

the French colonial forces and those of the Vietminh. On November 20,1946, a
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skirmish erupted when the French seized a vessel in Haiphong's harbor that was
163

suspected of transporting weapons for the Vietminh.

Three days later, a French

cruiser fired on the city itself following the expiration of a French ultimatum demanding
164

that the Vietminh relinquish military control of the city.

By late December 1946, war
165

was completely underway in Indochina between the French and the Vietminh.
The French-Indochinese war of 1946 to 1954 was by no means a conventional
war by any means. The developments in both weaponry and tactics that had occurred
during the World Wars were essentially negated by the climate conditions inherent to
South-East Asia. In Vietnam, campaigning was limited to the time period from mid166

October until mid-May, when the Monsoon season commenced.

The incessant rain

effectively prevented combat, due to the fact that,"The rain and fog closed down
offensive air operations, limited aerial observation, made motorized movement on
;/167

roads difficult and made off-road impossible,

Additionally,the French, despite their

best efforts, were unable to maintain security even in the areas purportedly under their
control. In northern Vietnam,for example,the protection of French lines of
168

communication cost them 3-4 casualties per every 100 kilometers of roads.

By mid-

1952,security behind French lines had devolved to the point that the elite formations
known as Mobile Groups were tasked solely with the maintenance of the
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169

communication lines.

The French also hindered their ability to engage in offensive

combat operations by their dogged insistence on the continued occupation of forts on
170

the Vietnamese-Chinese border.

At one point, 80,000 French troops were stationed
171

in more than 900 fronts along the frontier.

Perhaps,the most important reason why

this conflict was not conventional was its transition from colonial war to one involving
multiple outside forces.
The broadening of the French-Indochinese War began in 1949,the year the
Chinese Communists under Mao Tse-Tung defeated their Kuomintang opponents
172

following a brutal civil conflict.

This development effectively created a sanctuary for
173

the Vietminh that was invulnerable to French attacks.

From this point on,the

Vietnamese-Chinese border was a massive sieve through which supplies and troops
174

constantly flowed.

Another advantage this afforded the Vietminh was the ability to
175

train their recruits in complete safety,

The victory of the Chinese Communists also

forced the French to maintain their frontier outposts, which consequently tied down
large numbers of troops and prevented their participation in offensive combat
176

operations.

The Soviet Union also aided the Vietminh,supplying them with anti177

aircraft artillery, heavy mortars, conventional artillery and vehicles,

In addition to

granting their Communist brethren sanctuary along their southern border, the Chinese
169
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supplied both military advisors and personnel to both train and advise the Vietnamese
178

In the use of heavy weapons.

The Vietminh were also active in Laos, especially along
179

its extensive border with Vietnam.

France received aid from outside sources as well.

primarily the United States. Starting in 1950,the U.S. began to supply military and
180

financial aid to the French forces in Indochina.

At first, American aid was a boon to

the French,for the arrival of American aircraft enabled the French to discard their
obsolete and unreliable planes as well as allowed the French Far Eastern Air Force to
181

actually fulfill its ground support and transportation capabilities.

Though at first the

assistance from the United States was of great help to the French war efforts, it
increasingly became a massive hindrance. By 1952,the United States military was
heavily involved In French military planning, a concession demanded by them due to the
182

massive financial assistance bestowed upon the French,

The war's evolution from

one fought between two combatants to a conflict involving multiple entities not only
made it more complicated, but drastically transformed the political situation regarding
It. By accepting American monetary and military aid, France had effectively relinquished
the right to conduct the war devoid of outside interference. The United States had
gained the leverage necessary to participate in the war's strategic planning, and perhaps
more Importantly, to have undue influence on how it was conducted. Additionally, the
French war effort was further complicated by the assistance given their enemies by both
the USSR and the People's Republic of China. While the military and financial aid of
178
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their allies aided the Vietminh in their struggle, it did not inhibit the ability of the French
to wage war effectively. Rather, it was the presence of foreign advisors within
Indochina and the border sanctuaries granted to the Vietminh inside China only served
to hamstring the ability of the French military to fight unencumbered by political issues.
In essence, any attack that occurred within Chinese territory or resulted in the deaths of
Russians or Chinese was now an International incident'. Journalist Bernard Fall's
analysis of this is particularly insightful, as he argued that
As in the Korean War,the non-communist forces had worked themselves into a tactical
corner from which the only exit would have been a considerable broadening of the
political and strategic premises on which the war was fought; that is, an attack on the
Soviet Russian and Communist Chinese 'sanctuaries' behind the actual Communist
combatants.183
Though outside forces did much to transform the French-Indochina war from a conflict
between a colonial power and its subjects, a development that afforded a crucial
advantage to the Vietminh, it was the actions of the French themselves that brought
about the end of the conflict.
In histories recounting both the French-Indochina War and the conflict waged by
the United States against North Vietnam in the 1960's and 1970's, much praise has been
lavished upon the Vietnamese, while their opponents are scorned for incompetence or
for lacking the political will to win the struggle. Yet in the case of France's experience,
this was a conflict perpetuated in order to save face, not achieve victory. This attitude
directly manifested itself in the French choice of both tactics and strategy. While the
French did In fact fight with courage, audacity and determination throughout the
conflict, their pointed refrain from employing unconventional tactics to achieve victory
183
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all but guaranteed that the Vietminh would emerge victorious. France's overall strategy
was predicated upon engaging the enemy in open battle, in the hope that their
superiority in arms and tactical aptitude would result in victory. Such an attitude was
ignorant in view of the conditions in Indochina and the political aspects of the war. The
French-Indochina War was not waged in the conventional manner, in which opposing
entities fought over physical control over physical territories or landmarks. It was
instead a fluid conflict, with locations changing possession multiple times;furthermore.
there were no 'fronts',for the entire country featured multiple engagements in
different locations on a daily basis. This situation was partially caused by the tactics
favored by the Vietminh.
While the Vietminh did possess regular formations that utilized conventional
184

tactics quite effectively, these units were not engaged in combat on a daily basis.
Instead, it was the units organized at local and regional levels that engaged in the bulk
185

of dally combat operations.

The Vietminh had effectively engendered a nation-at-

arms, where each individual formation was utilized in the quest for victory. The
auxiliary units functioned both as a combat training school and a reserve source of
186

manpower for depleted regular formations.

Also, when a Vietminh regular unit was

engaged in a specific operation,the local detachments in that area were employed to
conduct reconnaissance, set up ambushes,commence diversionary attacks and provide
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187

security.

Thus, when any sizeable detachment from the roughly 50,000 Main Force

regulars was engaged in an operation,their ranks would be swelled by units from the
188

30,000-50,000

regional and guerilla forces. The VIetminh could function like a multi-

headed hydra, attacking the French at several points anywhere within the country. Such
a strategy could not easily be bested by conventional tactics that favored set-piece
engagements.
It was not as If the French were totally incapable of countering the
flexible tactics employed by the VIetminh; however,such deviations from the
conventional tactics were met with hostility. In the highlands populated by the French
allied Tai people, guerilla tactics were utilized to eradicate the presence of the VIetminh
189

for an estimated period of five years.

Though fighting the VIetminh on their own

terms had proved successful, this approach was frequently ignored by the French
190

military establishment.

Another under-utilized approach was the deployment of the

Mobile Groups; composite formations comprised of North Africans, Senegalese, ethnic
191

minorities in Vietnam, loyalist Vietnamese and French regulars.

Though the Mobile

Groups were elite formations, their ranks were decimated from serving as assault troops
192

rather than light infantry far too often.

The French were also hindered by the rapid

turnover in the position of the commanding officer in Indochina. The second
commander was Marshall de Lattre de Tasigny, who assumed the position in December
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1950, and provided the only combination of stability and tactical flexibility of his
193

peers.

De Lattre turned back all VIetminh offensives in 1951, and mobilized the

French civilians to aid in the war effort; unfortunately he was succumbing to cancer In
194

January 1952, which prompted his replacement.

He was then succeeded by Raoul

Salan, who in turn was replaced in May 1953 by General Henri Navarre,the 5*^ such
commander In Vietnam.195 The ascension of Navarre, however, had implications for the
future course of the conflict.
Navarre had been personally selected by then Prime Minister Rene Mayer, who
196

had known Navarre for a longtime.

It was likely that Mayer had chosen General

Navarre due his willingness to conduct the war in a manner conducive to the political
survival of Mayer's government^®^. According to William Duiker,
//

Navarre was told that his own military plans must reflect the determination of the
government to terminate the war by the Spring of 1956, when national elections were
scheduled. By implication, he would have to gear his own strategy to the likelihood of a
198
compromise political resolution to the conflict.
This mandate from Navarre's political overlords would be almost impossible to
achieve, especially given the reality of the situation on the ground. The French
Expeditionary Forces totaled 500,000 troops, yet all but 150,000 were tied down
199

defending fortifications and other defensive positions,

Furthermore, French

intelligence estimated the number of VIetminh troops had risen above 350,000 men, all
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200

of whom were presumably available for offensive operations.

Since political pressure

had ail but deprived General Navarre of the ability to make independent command
decisions, he sought to create a plan that could potentially succeed and gain the
approval of the French government. In the process of formulating such an operation.
Navarre adhered to one of the concepts favored by the French military establishment.
One of the major objectives of the French was to lure Vietminh regulars into a set-piece
201

engagement, which they hoped would be a decisive battle.

In fact,journalist Bernard

Fall, who was a combat correspondent, believes that this objective became a matter of
obsession for the French high command. Both the war and its tactics had long been the
subject of intense political discussion in France since the war began, and it was a divisive
202

issue.

Additionally, an audaciously bold plan would Impress the Americans, who were
203

on the verge of granting over 400 million dollars in military aid to the French,

Navarre

formulated a complex operation, which had been heavily influenced by recent fighting
in Laos.204 The knowledge the French had gleaned from this campaign was.
From their experience at Na Son, and to a lesser extent at Louang Phrabang and
Jars Camp,they concluded that a large fortified camp could be established In enemy
territory, supplied by air, and made invulnerable to Vietminh attack. They reasoned
further that Giap would attack such a camp, as he had done at Na Son, and that if the
bait offered Giap were large enough and attractive enough,they could get a great setpiece battle in which Giap would destroy his assault divisions in attacks against the
French fortified defenses.205
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The chosen location was situated on a strategic crossroads in the vicinity of the
206

Vietnamese-Laotian frontier, and was less than 200 miles from French airfields.

If

held, it could sever a vital Vietminh supply trail to China, and could function as a forward
operating base from which the French could attack the Vietminh within their own
207

territory.

Named after a small village located on a large plain, Dien Bien Phu was

chosen as the battlefield upon which the French hoped to annihilate the trained
208

divisions of Vo Nguyen Gaip's Vietminh infantry.

On November 20,1953,the Dien Bien Phu campaign commenced, with six
209

French airborne battalions landing on the battlefield as part of Operation Castor.

The

French goal of provoking the Vietminh leadership to deal with this development
occurred almost immediately, as the Vietminh halted plans for another campaign in
210

Laos to instead deal with the situation at Dien Bien Phu.

Several flaws in the French

strategy were also exposed:they soon found that their operations were confined to the
valley within which the base was located, and any hope of undertaking the offensive
211

was negated by supply problems.

Due to the fact that Dien Bien Phu was within

Vietminh occupied territory, the only way it could be supplied was by aircraft. The
I.

French Air Force was plagued by a considerable shortage of trained mechanics, so much
so that they could only afford to keep 75% of all aircraft within Vietnam operational at
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212

the same time.

Theoretically, a re-supply mission to a base of that size required

between 60-75 transport planes, and the French only had between 75-100 aircraft of
213

that type in Indochina.

Though a rough airstrip had been constructed at Dien Bien
214

Phu, it could not sustain a large volume of daily traffic.

Shortly after Vietminh troops

arrived in the valley, they destroyed the airstrip and ultimately forced the French to
215

drop supplies via parachute canisters.

Though roughly 120 tons of supplies were

dropped by French aircraft,the garrison at Dien Bien Phu never recovered more than
216

100 tons, which was an amount far too miniscule to mount an effective defense.

The

scarcity of supplies was the least of the French worries, however,for the arrival of the
Vietminh portended more serious developments.
Starting in December 1953,the Vietminh were able to amass 49,000 regulars in
217

the vicinity of Dien Bien Phu prior the beginning of the battle in March 1954.

Supply

issues were not of concern to the Vietminh,for nearly 100,000 coolies were recruited to
218

transport the bulk of the necessary goods.

The Vietminh artillery was transported by
219

trucks, and when necessary, dismantled, and carried in pieces to the valley,

The

arrival of the artillery was crucial,for it would prove to be one of the deciding factors in
the campaign. Since the French did not control the mountains above the plain upon
which Dien Bien Phu was located,the Vietminh were afforded the advantage of holding
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220

the higher ground.

Based upon the suggestions of their Chinese advisors,the

Vietminh constructed a series of tunnels within the mountains; which enabled them to
pull the guns inside the tunnels, and move them to new positions almost
221

instantaneously.

Though the French had underestimated the ability of the

Vietnamese to transport artillery to this remote site, the skillful concealment of the guns
222

made them all but impervious to being destroyed by French counter-battery fire.

Also, the gun emplacements were dug Into the slope in a manner that did not disturb
223

the foliage, which made them almost impossible to spot from the air.

Not only were

the French woefully deficient in the number of artillery pieces, but their fire
224

coordination and fire direction was poor as well.

By retaining both the heights and a

decisive superiority in artillery, the Vietminh forces held the advantage prior to the
beginning of actual combat.
The French position was tenuous at best by March 1954. Due to the supply
problems,they were deprived of steel, wood and concrete with which to build
fortifications, and were forced to construct positions with the chronically wet soil of the
225

Vietnamese flatlands.

They were also overwhelmingly outnumbered,for only 10,800
226

troops comprised the garrison.

Their inferior numbers were also compromised by the

fact that only the French regulars. Foreign Legionnaires and North African troops were
reliable, the ethnic Tais and Vietnamese detachments were poorly trained and
220
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227

unreliable underfire.
228

en masse.

In fact, by the third day of the battle,the Tai began to desert

Such conditions all but ensured that the French defense of Dien Bien Phu

would be ineffective.
The most crucial phase of the Dien Bien Phu Campaign began on March 13,1954,
when the 312*^ Division of the Vietminh attacked the French detachment at the
strongpoint code-named "Beatrice".^^® Though the initial Vietminh assault was repulsed
with heavy casualties, the Vietminh had overrun strongpoints 'Beatrice' and 'Gabriele',
and had forced the abandonment of'Anne Marie'.^^° A temporary lull in the battle
lasted from March 17^" until the

By the month of April, the battle for Dien Bien

Phu had degenerated into trench warfare, with the Vietminh constructing miles of
shallow trenches, which allowed them to get closer to the French lines without suffering
232

large casualties.

The battle ended on May 7*^ 1954, when the French base camp was

finally overrun and the garrison surrendered.^^^
The conclusion of the French-Indochina War may have signaled the end of the
French colonial era In Indochina, but the internal political issues within Vietnam were
not resolved by the end of hostilities. Following the end of the Dien Bien Phu campaign.
234

a conference began in Geneva, Switzerland to negotiate a peace treaty.

Yet the

peace talks did not take place solely between the two combatants: Great Britain, the
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USSR,the People's Republic of China, Cambodia, Laos,the United States, and the
235

nominally independent Vietnam of Emperor Bao Dai participated as well.

After over

two months of negotiation,the terms of an armistice were agreed upon on July 21,
1954.236 The treaty's stipulations included the French evacuation of Vietnam by
October,the partitioning of Vietnam along the 17^*^ Parallel,the creation of an
International Control Commission to supervise the enforcement of the armistice, and
the agreement that a referendum on the possible unification of Vietnam would occur on
237

July 20, 1956.

Yet almost from its ratification, the Geneva Accords were stood on

shaky ground. As author Jean Lacoutre remarked.
It is noteworthy that what has been generally come to be called 'The Geneva
Agreements of 1954' is in fact a series of armistice agreements made by the French
Army representatives and the Viet Minh delegates, comprising the clauses enumerated
above. Nothing else was signed, particularly not the final declaration made at the
conference.238
The pro-French Vietnamese government in Saigon refused to sign the agreements, and
was also informed by France that only they would be considered the trustees of
239

sovereignty for the Vietnamese people by the French government.
240

also refused to sign the agreements.

The United States

The entire sequence of events in Geneva had

been about creating a peaceful exit for the French In Indochina, not to grant the gift of
national sovereignty to the Vietnamese. While the Vietmlnh had achieved victory on
the battlefield, their ultimate goal of gaining independence had been obstructed by
both the terms of the armistice agreements and by the non-compliance of the pro235
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French Vietnamese in Saigon and the United States. It was at this juncture that the
struggle for power in Indochina underwent a transformation: The original goal of
attaining national independence had been only partially gained. Though the colonial
ruler had been forcibly ejected,they had managed to preserve a state in southern
Vietnam that was not beholden to the victorious Vietminh and its Communist
leadership. Furthermore,the Influence of France had been eclipsed by that of the
United States, a superpower determined to halt the expansion of Communism. With
the continued buildup of the American presence in southern Vietnam, it was becoming
Increasingly apparent that the Vietnamese themselves could not settle the issue of
whether to unify or remain in separate states without outside interference.
Rather than chronicle the history of Vietnam up to the unification of the country
in 1975, it is far more important to examine the motivations of the leadership of North
Vietnam for prolonging the conflict in Indochina. Ho Chi Minh and his fellow
Communists had ostensibly attained what they had struggled for so long: an
independent state in Indochina that would be governed according to their political
beliefs. While they did not possess of all Vietnam in 1954, it was highly conceivable that
the two halves of the country could still be re-united. Yet their eventual decision to
recommence hostilities was not made rashly nor was it prompted by a fanatical desire
to further the spread of Communism. Though there was a respite from war in Vietnam,
It would begin again due to the developments in both North and South Vietnam.
Following the signing of the Geneva Accords, a significant population shift took
place in Indochina. While some moved north to join the nascent Communist state of

47

North Vietnam, more than 800,000 emigrated south, many of who were educated and
241

part of the professional class.

The exodus of trained professionals essentially crippled
242

the economy in Northern Vietnam.

Additionally,the area that comprised the

Democratic Republic of Vietnam lacked enough productive farming areas to produce
243

enough rice to feed the population.

The regime's attempt to increase crop

production by redistributing land not only failed, but was so unpopular that Ho Chi Minh
244

was forced to publicly admit that errors had been made.

The North Vietnamese were
245

also heavily dependent on aid from other Communist states, primarily the Chinese.
The combination of the economic problems that resulted from a conversion to a
nationalized economy, lack of adequate food resources, and the dependence on the
Chinese, was particularly worrisome to the Communist leadership. They were also
extremely cognizant of the fact that the bulk of Indochina's resources were completely
denied to them,owing to the fact that the government of Ngo Dinh Diem in South
Vietnam had refused to hold the promised 1956 reunification referendum, and
246

furthermore, was extremely hostile In its dealings with its northern neighbors.

As

Jean Lacoutre wrote.
The instillation of the fanatically anti-CommunIst Ngo Family In Saigon, Washington's
unresolved support of that dictatorship, and the constant increase of American forces in
the Southern Zone made it clear to the men of Hanoi that they faced not just a delay
with regard to reunification, but a final partitioning, which would imprison them forever
in their narrow and meager zone and weld them completely to China; and that
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moreover a platform was perhaps being established in the South from which some day a
247
military action might be launched against them.
Clearly, the leaders of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam felt that both the security
and further independence of their state was at risk. Setbacks incurred during their
attempts to restructure the economy of Northern Vietnam had made them partly
dependent on subsidies from other Communist states, notably China. Being beholden
to Communist China was particularly worrisome, due to the fact that the Chinese were
an ancestral enemy and rival of the Vietnamese. Additionally, the existence of a hostile
state to the South that was allied with a foreign power opposed to any Communist state
was a credible threat to the nascent Communist state north of the 17^*^ Parallel. Though
the Southern Vietnamese were perceived as a threat,they were also perceived as being
248

a puppet regime that the Americans had inherited from the French.

The actions

undertaken by the authorities of the Saigon government did much to reinforce such an
opinion, which would help prompt the renewal of hostilities by the North Vietnamese.
From the perspective of the Vietnamese Communists,the government of the
Saigon regime held a tenuous grip on the reins of power. This, combined with their
repression of political dissidents in the South, made the possibility of winning the
support of the Southern people even more feasible. Ngo DInh Diem,the President of
the Republic of Vietnam, was not a popular leader; in fact most of his supporters were
249

from the Vietnamese Catholic population, of which he was a member.

In order to

consolidate his authority and to Impress the Americans, Diem began to eradicate his
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250

political opponents.

All parties opposed to his own were labeled Communists, and

were subject to arrest by his political police, or could be sent to detention camps for
251

subversive political elements.

Religious sects like the Hoa Hao, Cao Dai and Buddhists
252

endured government persecution and repression.

Even the powerful Binh Xuyen,the

Saigonese criminal society that controlled gambling, prostitution, and drug trafficking In
253

the Cho Lon district was not immune from Diem's repressive measures.

The enmity

that the Diem government aroused among the people was exploited to great effect by
the Communists. In fact, the systematic persecution of the Hoa Hoa, Cao Dai, and Binh
Xuyen by the Diem government had the effect of ending their opposition to
Communism. In 1955, a large partisan band composed of members of the religious
sects and the Binh Xuyen brokered a deal with Communist military leaders to coordinate
254

their actions against the South Vietnamese government.

Many of the Vietnamese who were persecuted by the regime of Ngo Dinh Diem
found their way to the guerilla bands, whether Communist or not,that opposed the
255

government in Saigon.

In fact,some Vietminh veterans In Cochin-China rekindled
256

their partisan network and began to call themselves the National Liberation Front.
Their March 1960 proclamation that called for resistance to the Intolerable actions of
Diem's government drew the attention of many, especially the Communist leaders in
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: 257
Hanoi.
While not an explicitly Communist organization,the NLF was regarded as

politically acceptable by Hanoi, which was likely due to the fact that Its leader, Nguyen
Huu Tho was a fervent Marxist.258 Additionally, the NLF was more than willing to work
259

with the Communists in the North to depose Diem.

By late 1961, both the American

and Saigonese intelligence services estimated that the NLF had over 200,000
260

members.

In January 1962, an organization called the Peoples Revolutionary Party
261

was created in Hanoi to serve as the Communist opposition in the south.

The PRP

was intended to function as the 'left wing' of the NLF,for Ho Chi Minh wanted
262

Communist militants to control, but not ostensibly lead the NLF.

Thus,the National

Liberation Front was intended to mimic the purpose the Vietminh had served during
World War II and the French-Indochina War, an inclusive popular front that would fight
for a goal that would not only serve to further the Interests of the Communists, but pave
the way for their future political control of all of Indochina. Besides, by the time that
the PRP was created in 1962, South Vietnam was in the midst of a state of war in its
263

rural districts.

Ho Chi Minh and his regime wanted to transform the anti-Diem

insurgents Into the vanguard of the Communist offensive in the South,so that the
reunification of the country by force could occur.^®^ After all, the Hanoi government
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was utterly convinced that the 'path of violence' was the only means by which they
265

could control the entire country.

Though conflict for power in Vietnam did not end until 1975, with the
triumphant capture of Saigon by the North Vietnamese,the events that occurred after
1962 are tainted by the involvement of the United States of America. By 1961,the
United States was giving the Republic of Vietnam three hundred million dollars in
266

military aid, and had a force of over 4,000 American military advisors in country.

The

American subsidization and support of the Saigon government as well as its massive
buildup of Its military forces within Vietnam effectively made the fighting in Vietnam a
matter of ideology rather than a civil conflict. Both the Soviet Union and the People's
Republic of China aided the North Vietnamese, utilizing the conflict as a training exercise
to pit their weapons and tactics against those of the United States. The United States
and several of its allies within the South East Asia (Collective Defense)Treaty
Organization (SEATO) participated in the conflict; South Korea, Australia, and other
member states sent detachments to Vietnam. Furthermore,the talks between the
United States and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam to negotiate an end to America's
involvement excluded the Republic of Vietnam. Thus, it was only after the US Military
departed the country in 1973 did the war once again transition to a civil conflict.
The path that Ho Chi Minh and the Vietnamese Communists traveled to attain
political power in Vietnam was truly a long and winding road. Before the beginning of
the Second World War, nationalist sentiment in Vietnam had largely been confined to
265
266
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the urban bourgeoisie and intellectuals such as Ho Chi Minh who chose self-imposed
exile abroad. The French Surete, or colonial political police had been extremely
effective at preventing the existence of indigenous Vietnamese political groups and the
dissemination of anti-colonial treatises. During World War II, however,the French
colonial administrators of the Vichy regime were more concerned with preventing the
Japanese occupation from turning from temporary Into being permanent. This afforded
Ho Chi Minh and the Vietnamese Communists to return to Vietnam and the opportunity
to create a revolutionary movement that would appeal to the Vietnamese masses. They
effectively utilized the deeply ingrained Vietnamese hatred of foreign occupiers to build
up their numbers and to carve out an area in the Viet Bac in which they had political
power. They also employed the Vietminh as a method to coalesce Vietnamese
nationalist sentiment into an organization that they would control. Upon receiving
news of Japan's surrender to the Allied Powers,the Vietminh seized the Initiative and
proclaimed the existence of an independent Vietnamese state in the hope the French
would be unwilling to fight to regain control of Vietnam or be pressured into allowing it
to exist as a free state. The Vietnamese Communists adroitly presented themselves as
nationalists who desired a democratic form of government in order to win the support
of their political opponents as well as that of the people. However,they merely
pretended to be willing to share power in order to entice their rivals into cooperating
with them. After this had been achieved,the other political factions were forcibly
disbanded and their leaders either assassinated or forced to seek sanctuary abroad. The
reluctance of the French to relinquish control of their colony in Indochina led to a
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protracted period in which the Vietnamese Communists fought the French and the
Americans in two separate conflicts. Throughout their struggle for political dominance
in Vietnam,the Communists demonstrated a tremendous acumen for winning the
support of the Vietnamese peasantry, as well as using the concept of national
independence as a vehicle with which to build a support base. They also were adept at
seizing any opportunity to further their cause, especially with the seizure of power
following the surrender of Japan as well as the 1945 assassination campaign in Saigon.
In essence, both their determination to gain power and political acumen aided the ICP in
the fruition of their goal of a single Vietnam governed by the Communist Party.
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The birth of the Algerian nation on July 5,1962 marked the end in a long and
perplexing chapter in the history of both Algeria and France, one marked by violence
and bitter political maneuvering. France invaded Algeria In 1830 on the pretext of an
insult to the French Consul by the Dey of Algiers, who struck the Frenchman with his fly
swatter. This war however, was a political diversion for the last Bourbon ruler, Charles
X, in the waning days of his reign. Thus,from its inception,the French presence in
Algeria was an Issue of politics rather than economics. It would never be the crown
jewel of an overseas Empire, as India was to Great Britain, or Indochina to France. It
was instead a frontier province, one in which only the most hardy and desperate of
French immigrants would choose to settle. In the de-colonization era,following the
conclusion of the Second World War, Algeria was relatively quiet until guerrilla attacks
on the French began on November 1,1954. Recently freed from the war in the newly
independent Indochina,the French government deployed nearly half a million troops to
its overseas departments in Algeria and by doing so had essentially defeated the
insurgent National Liberation Front. Yet, Instead of prosecuting the war to its
conclusions. Prime Minister Charles De Gaulle instead chose to negotiate with the
Algerian nationalists, reaching a consensus that would allow Algeria to become
independent. The France that relinquished its long held province of Algeria was not a
France crippled economically by the conflict, nor had it experienced a widespread
protest movement regarding the continued hostilities In Algeria. To look at this conflict
as merely another war between a colonial power and Its indigenous subjects is to do a
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disservice to the entirety of this poignant historical episode. The French-AIgerian War
was an extremely complicated event, one that involved multiple forces. The French not
only were forced to combat the independence movement, but also their own rebellious
citizens inside Algeria, whose own agenda did not correlate with those of the authorities
in Paris. After 1960,the rebellious French settlers became another insurgent group that
France had to contend with. As for the ethnic Algerians,the fighting against the French
was often punctuated by an internecine power struggle between the Front de Liberation
Nationale and its political rivals that also sought to dominate the independence
movement. Though the anti-government French insurrectionists and the Algerians were
bitter enemies,they ultimately both desired the same goal: to control an Algeria
independent of French rule.
By the 1950's nearly one million French citizens of European ancestry would
reside in Algeria. The first settlers arrived in 1848, and subsequent waves arrived
following periods of violence or economic recession.^ They came to be known as the
Pied-Noirs or Black Feet and came from French, Italian, Maltese and Spanish stock.^
These hardy settlers originally came from the dregs of society,to eke out a living in a
harsh country and to hope for the economic prosperity that had been denied to them in
Europe.^ In time the Europeans would dominate industrial production, land ownership
in the most fertile areas, and the bicameral Algerian legislature."^ After the colonists had
been granted the right to self-administration in 1870, Algeria was no longer treated or
^ David C. Gordon, The Passing of French Algeria(London: Oxford University Press, 1966), 15.
^ Alexander Harrison, Challenging De Gaulle: The O.A.S. and the Counterrevolution In Algieria 1954-1962
(New York: Praegar, 1989), 19.
^ Harrison, Challenging De Gaulle 19.
^ Gordon, The Passing of French Algerla,Sl-52.
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considered to be a mere imperial possession, it was legally a province of France,
inhabited by its citizens and participating in the governance of the French Republic.^
The three departments of Oran, Algiers and Constantine each had one senator and two
deputies in the National Assembly in Paris.® The Pied-Noirs were intensely patriotic
citizens who were also intensely proud of living in Algeria, although they remained a
small minority of the Algerian population. As described by Alexander Harrison,
Their fervent attachment to France was not based merely on love of things French. As
at the onset of colonization,they realized that in terms of demographics,they would
only survive by linking their fate to that of metropolitan France. In the face of a hostile
majority whose birthrate continued to explode,the settlers would only endure if they
were closely associated with France.^
In short, Algeria's European population was not comprised of expatriates seeking to
exploit Algeria's natural resources for their own gain. It was instead inhabited by
settlers for whom Algeria was the only home they had known. Their ancestors had been
members of the lower social classes of the 19^^ Century who had sought to better their
economic prospects by Immigrating to North Africa. The fortunes of the Pied-Noirs were
tied to their farms, vineyards and businesses in Algeria, and they would not part
willingly from these, located in what both they and many of their brethren in the
Metropole considered a province of France, not a mere colonial possession that could
be abandoned with the stroke of a pen. When hostilities commenced with the Algerian
Front de Liberation Nationale (FNL) in 1954, France was fighting to protect the lives and
homes of nearly a million citizens, not merely the economic and political interests of the

^ Gordon, The Passing of French Algeria, 17.
® Gordon, The Passing of French Algeria, 17.
^ Harrison, Challenging De Gaulle, 23.
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State itself. Thus,the French stake in Algeria was immense and could not be easily
forsaken by the government in Paris.
The uprising of the Algerian Muslims was no spontaneous event,for they had
long been discontented with French governmental policies that had made them secondclass citizens in their own homeland. The Muslims had long been seeking to obtain both
citizenship and the franchise,to no avail except for receiving nominal rights. One of the
first concrete instances of this was following World War I, when French Prime Minister
Georges Clemenceau allowed the Muslim elite to be classified as French subjects, which
allowed them some measure of participation in local government.® The events during
and following World War II would be more formative in crystallizing opposition to the
French government. In order to win the support of the local population following the
expulsion of the Vichy French and Axis from Algeria, the Free French government in
exile made lavish promises to the Muslim political leaders, promises that would be
reneged on after the conclusion of hostilities in 1945.® For example,in March 1944,16
classifications of Muslims received full citizenship, which allowed 16,000 to join the First
10

Algerian Electoral College and 1,500,000 to vote in the Second Electoral College.

The

Muslim vote in the First College was negated by that of the overwhelming majority of
11

the other 500,000 members, who were all ethnic European voters.

The voting power

of the Muslims in the Second College was extremely curtailed, as Muslim political
parties could only have seventeen out of the sixty total seats in the lower house of the
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Algerian Assembly.

The voting itself was notoriously fraudulent,so much so that

prominent nationalist political leader Ferhat Abbas was unable to win a seat in his
hometown of Setif.13 As the Braces describe it, "In Algeria, electoral fraud is a state
//14

institution considered legitimate in order to defend French sovereignty.

The critical

event that would precipitate the conflict was the riot in Setif on Victory in Europe Day:
May 8^^ 1945. A march by a contingent of Algerian Muslims waving banners inscribed
with nationalist phrases and displaying the Algerian Flag was fired upon by the local
15

police, which started a massive street riot.

The death of twenty-one French settlers

led to an extreme reaction by the French police and military.^^ Not only did the French
Air Force attack the Muslim quarter In the town, but,"during the Campaign the
Senegalese and Foreign Legion troops pillaged, burned, violated and killed in complete
//17

liberty.

Though the official estimate of Muslim dead was 1,500, author David Gordon
18

asserts that the actual figure was between 6,000 and 9,000 dead.

This brutal

repression of Algerian nationalism led young patriots to reject the traditional Muslim
19

political parties and instead plan to win their independence by force.
The Setif incident was a significant occurrence for Algerian nationalists. In
addition to the brutal repression of the Muslims of Setif, the French arrested or
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20

deported the most prominent leaders of the Algerian political parties.

The more

liberal of the Algerian nationalists blamed the radical Muslim nationalist Messali Hadj
and his Mouvement pour le Triomphe des Libertes Democratiques{MTlD)for instigating
the riot in Setif and undermining their attempts to achieve more rights for Algerians
21

through peaceful means.

At the same time, however,the liberals began to lose many

among their political support base, who had come to the conclusion that France would
never relinquish its hold on Algeria. It was a critical juncture in the history of the
Algerian independence movement,for the established politicians within it had lost
much of their credibility due to their inability to obtain concessions from the French.
With the Islamic MTLD rendered impotent by the deportation of Hadj, and the liberals
22

losing the trust of their constituents, a power vacuum had essentially been created.
The men who would replace them were not interested in dialogue with France; instead
23

they were willing to use force to achieve their desired goals.

Formed by political activist Ait Ahmed in 1947,the Organisation Speciaie(OS)
began to make preparations for an uprising,forming cells of militants and amassing
funds for the future conflict.24 The OS was shut down in 1949 by French security forces
25

after activist Mohamed Ahmed Ben Bella robbed the Central Post Office in Oran.

it

was this robbery that made Ben Bella's reputation as an up and coming leader in the OS;
in addition, the three million francs stolen provided the movement with its first
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26

operation funds.

Forced to flee Algeria, OS operatives either traveled to metropolitan

France to continue their activities among the Algerian immigrant population, to Cairo or
27

to the refuge of the Aures and Kabylia Mountains.

It was this dispersal that led to the

genesis of the armed resistance movement to French rule. In the mountains,the OS
activists continued to raise funds for their cause while they built support among the
28

mountain tribesmen through their arbitration of tribal disputes.

In fact, many of these

OS operatives would become commanders in the Algerian Armee de Liberation
Nationaie, the military wing of the soon to be created Front de Liberation Nationaie
(FLN). It was in Egypt, however,that the Algerian independence movement would be
29

conceived with considerable support from Gamal Nasser,the then President of Egypt.
In Egypt, Mohamed Ben Bella would become the face of the Algerian independence
movement, owing to his personal relationship with Nasser, who's Army and Security
30

Service trained the future guerrilla forces of the FLN.

In 1953, Ben Bella, tribal

chieftains Belkacem Krim and Mostefa Ben Boulaid and the militant Mohamed Boudiaf
31

formed the Comite Revoiutionaire d'Unite et d'Action (CRUA).

CRUA was formed with the intention of serving to unite the various Algerian
political factions within one organization.^^ Mohamed Boudiaf attempted to convince
Messali Hadj and the MTLD to join, but an internal power struggle between Had]and his

26

Horne, A Savage War of Peace, 75.
Brace, Ordeal in Algeria, 84.
28
Brace, Ordeal in Algeria, 84.
29
Brace, Ordeal in Algeria, 85.
30
Brace, Ordeal in Algeria, 85.
31
Brace, Ordeal in Algeria, 86.
32
William B. Quandt, Revolution and Political Leadership: Algeria, 1954-1968,(Cambridge, MA:The M.l.T.
Press, 1969),90.
27

bi

61
33

opponents prevented the reaching of a decision, and Boudiafs efforts came to naught.
While Boudiaf was preoccupied in his dealings with the Muslim politicians, Mohamed
Ben Bella and twenty one other former OS members were in the midst of creating a
revolutionary organization.^^ This would eventually be known as the Front de Liberation
35

Nationale.

From its inception,the FLN reflected the ideals of its founders, who were

convinced that only they could lead a successful insurrection. They were extremely
reticent to Include politicians and political parties, except those that were 'all purely
Algerian parties and movements'.^® They deliberately excluded both the Algerian
Communist Party and Messali Hadj's supporters, both of which they suspected as being
untrustworthy and focused on attaining political power only.^^ They were especially
suspicious of Messali Hadj, whom they considered to be a megalomaniac. The
exclusions of both the Islamists and Communists were self-serving however,for the
FLN's founders believed that either faction would subvert the founders' own authority if
38

allowed to join.

The failure to include Messali Hadj and his supports had

repercussions,for it led to the creation of the Mouvement Nationaliste Algerienne
(MNA), which would fight against the FLN in the midst of the struggle against the
39

French.

In fact, at this formative stage in the FLN's development,they were already
40

fighting against the remaining supporters of Hadj and the MTLD.
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The early months of 1954 would be crucial for the resistance movement. In
March of 1954, all OS members in France were ordered back to Algeria and planning
sessions were held in earnest in Cairo.41 Furthermore,the defeat of the French Army at
the hands of Viet-Minh at Dien-Bien-Phu served as further inspiration for the budding
revolutionaries.42 On November 1^^ 1954, a wave of attacks on French military and
police installations as well as acts of sabotage in the cities of Algiers and Oran signaled
43

the beginning of the French-Algerian War.

Initially the revolt was confined to the remote Aures and Kabylia mountains and was not
wideiy supported by the Algerian Muslim population.^ In order to garner support for
the FLN and its military forces in the Army of National Liberation (ALN),the leaders
attempted to drive a wedge between the French settlers and the Algerian Muslim
population.^^ The primary targets of the guerrilla fighters orfellagha, were local officials
of the villages and those who openly supported the French.^® Thus, elected officials,
policemen, school teachers, war veterans and especially tax collectors were targeted for
assassination.47 Another early tactic was attacking isolated farms owned by Europeans
and forcing their Muslim farmhands and neighbors at gunpoint to participate in their
murder; this both fostered mistrust and hostility between the Europeans and Muslims,
but it also forced the reluctant killers into joining the rebellion or risk death at the hands
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48

of the French security forces.

In the Kabylia and Aures Mountains,the local leaders of

the FLN began to levy taxes, conscript troops and gather supplies from the mountain
tribes, effectively setting up an alternative state in the areas where French authority
was the weakest.49 In addition to the guerrilla, the Organisation Poiitique et
Administrative (OPA) was used to galvanize support for FLN's cause by coercing the local
50

villagers to support the movement both financially and by serving it as auxiliaries.

The

OPA activists, who often lived in the villages rather than with the resistance fighters.
were also responsible for collecting a tax of 500 francs monthly from each family in the
51

village.

In addition to their activities in rural areas,terrorist and sabotage cells were
52

activated in the cities of Oran and Algiers by July 1955.

It would be the events that

transpired in the urban areas that indicated a growing rift between the French
themselves and brought international scrutiny to the conflict.
Due to the lessons learned about fighting guerrilla insurgents in Indochina, and
the commitment of the Moliet government to defeating the insurgency,the French
fared well militarily in operations in the hinterland. Though he was elected in 1956, Guy
Moliet was elected Prime Minister solely on the promise of achieving peace in Algeria.
53

By the spring of 1955,the French had 100,000 troops in Algeria.

Further measures

such as the appointment of Robert Lacoste as Resident Minister of Algeria and the
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recalling of reservists to active duty were also quickly implemented.

In 1956,the

French National Assembly granted special powers to the government for use in Algeria,
such as control over travel between France and Algeria and the use of summary military
55

courts to try suspected FLN militants without providing them the use of legal counsel.
Furthermore,the French employed more mobile units than those stationed in fortified
56

positions, a lesson they had learned from their defeat in Indochina.

Efforts were also

made to win the hearts and minds of the rural Muslim population by providing them
protection from the FLN irregulars who all too frequently did not discriminate between
those who actively supported the French and those who wished to remain neutral in the
conflict.57 Specialized Administrative Sections (S.A.S.) were set up in rural villages and
assigned a French administrator who would help modernize technology in the village
and attempt to create self defense forces for the villagers.^® David Galula, who served
as a military liaison to this project, described the process as a gradual one in which the
French would initially hire natives to help with the construction of public facilities; these
natives would later be used to build military installations and would ultimately be armed
59

to protect the town itself.

The harsh measures enacted by some FLN commanders

such as the penalty of cutting off the ears and noses of those who violated their ban on
60

tobacco and alcohol actually aided the French more than it aided the guerrillas.

54

Galula, Pacification in Algeria: 1956-1958, 13.
Brace, Ordeal in Algeria, 133.
56
Galula, Pacification in Algeria: 1956-1958, 24.
57
Brace, Ordeal in Algeria, 118.
58
Brace, Ordeal In Algeria, 118.
59
Galula, Pacification in Algeria: 1956-1958,93.
60
Horne, A Savage War ofPeace ,112.
55

65

The disparity of numbers between the FLN irregulars and the French forces
essentially confined the war in the period of 1954 until 1956 to the Algerian hinterland
or bled. The French military was able to confine the main rebel forces to the Aures and
Kabylia Mountain ranges, where their knowledge of the terrain compensated for their
extremely low numbers of fighters. It can be construed that the French Algerian War at
this point was a minor conflict in the frontier area of the province, one that did not
really threaten the security of the urban areas of Algeria or that of metropolitan France.
In fact, unrest in the mountains was no cause for alarm, as resistance to the governing
power by the mountain tribesmen had been going on since the period of Roman rule.
Had the FLN not commenced its terrorist operations in the cities of Algiers, Oran, and in
those French cities with significant Algerian immigrant populations, this conflict likely
might have continued for decades due to its low intensity and overall threat to French
national security.
The FLN suffered a series of setbacks. On the 22"*^ of October, 1956, Mohamed
Ben Bella and four other major FLN leaders were captured when the French forced the
Moroccan plane carrying them from Morocco to Tunisia to land in the airport servicing
Algiers.®^ Furthermore,the construction of electric fences on the Tunisian and
Moroccan borders, starting In 1957, greatly inhibited the ability of the FLN to re-supply
62

and reinforce its detachments within Algeria.

However, when the locus of the fighting

was moved from the bled to the urban centers,the French-Algerlan War made the
crucial transformation from minor, yet annoying provincial uprising, to a conflict that
61
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could be easily publicized by the media and brought to the attention of the French
population in the Metropole. In the cities of Algiers, Oran and Constantine,the French
military and security apparatus could not easily control the reporting of events as it had
been able to do In the hinterland. More importantly,the methods used to confront the
FLN's cells could not be disguised and the brutal, yet effective measures they employed
would engender political debate and protest within France itself.
Under the initial leadership of Larbi Ben M'Hidi,the FLN began a series of deadly
bombing attacks on the European citizens of Algiers in September of 1956.®^ Though
the bombings occurring from September through early November had netted roughly
one hundred casualties,the FLN increased the frequency of the attacks in early 1957,
hoping to sow even more fear and trepidation among the Pied-Noirs and publicize their
quest for independence.^ The French responded by deploying the lO**' Parachute
Division of General Jacques Massu to eliminate the terrorist threat in Algiers, a move
that resulted in a pyrrhIc victory for the French cause in Algeria. General Paul
Aussaresses, Massu's chief of intelligence during the Battle of Algiers, described the
approach of the General Government:"Since It was impossible to get rid of urban
terrorism through normal police and judicial procedure,they employed the
//65

paratroopers to replace both the policemen and the judges.

Though the summary

execution of captured FLN militants and suspected members was quite normal in the
rural areas of Algeria, the occurrence of such actions in the cities aroused passionate
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anti-war sentiment among the French living on the mainland. In his oral history that
chronicled the assistance of the FLN in metropolitan France by actual French citizens.
author Martin Evans points out that the media's reporting of the French Army
employing reprisals, torture and other harsh measures rekindled for many their
memories of the Nazi occupation of France in World War II. For many Frenchmen, life
under the Nazis in Occupied France represented a descent into barbarism and a period
66

of the devolution of civilization.

It was also considered by many intellectuals to be In

violation of the 1946 Constitution of the Fourth Republic, which expressly forbade the
infringement of a person's liberty by force.®^ This opposition to the tactics used by the
French military in Algeria helped increase the unpopularity of the conflict among the
citizens of Metropolitan France, a sentiment that was not shared nor understood by the
Pied-Noirs.
During the period in which the fighting in Algiers became the focus of the
conflict, a clandestine struggle was taking place among the Algerians themselves. On
the 31^^ of May, 1957,the French authorities disclosed that its forces had come upon
68

the aftermath of a massacre of peasants in the southern Kabylian village of Melouza.
Three nights earlier, an FLN detachment had descended upon the town and detained all
69

local men of fighting age in the town's mosque.

The FLN butchered over 300 men, and

the French quickly used this massacre to bring to the world's attention the savagery of
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their opponents.

What had happened at Melouza, was entirely political in nature.

Melouza was home to supporters of the Mouvement Nationaliste Algerienne(MNA),
which had been formed in 1955 by Islamic Algerian nationalists in response to their
deliberate exclusion from the F.LN.71 Since this schism, a state of vendetta had existed
72

between the political rivals.

This conflict was not confined solely to Algeria, however.

for the fighting aiso spread to metropolitan France as well.^^. Between October 1956
and October 1957, violence between MNA and FLN partisans among the Algerian
74

immigrant community caused the deaths of 550 and over 2,200 wounded.

Prior to the

FLN attack on Melouza,the local tribal chieftain named Bellounis, who was a virulent
MNA supporter, had been instigating violent attacks on the forces of the FLN's Wilaya 3
75

in the Kabylia Mountains.

Bellounis, on behalf of the MNA,had been attempting to

recruit a guerriila force to counter the FLN on what was considered to be its own
76

territory.

While the majority of the Berbers were supporters of the FLN,the Beni77

lllemane and Ouled Nail tribes opposed it due to their tribal loyalty to the MNA.

Thus,

the massacre had been prompted by the recent resurgence of the M.N.A as a political
entity. Subsequently, Bellounis, who had somehow managed to escape the entire
Melouza killing, transformed his Beni-lllemane tribe into a French allied Third Force',
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78

who waged war against the FLN detachments in the vicinity of the Sahara desert.

The

occurrence of this massacre and other incidents highlights a little known segment of the
French-Algerian War:the FLN's quest to eradicate all political and military opposition to
its authority among the Algerian people. In fact,the FLN believed that their biggest
enemy besides the French was the MNA,whose members they considered to be
traitors; any individual or group of MNA supporters were to be attacked and eliminated
79

without mercy.

Little is recorded after the deliberate murder of over 300 men in the

village of Melouza,for the incident was intended to prove a point, by perpetrating this
act, the FLN had effectively declared that any Algerians who opposed them would see
their lives forfeit.
Living under the constant threat of danger had both politically radicalized the
Pied-Noirs and made them more determined than ever to ensure that Algeria would
remain a French province. They had no qualms about taking harsh measures to defend
themselves, even if it meant that they would circumvent the authority of the Resident
Minister. For example. General Paul Aussaresses recounts that Massu's paratroopers
were in part ordered into Algiers because the Pied-Noirs informed the government that
if the bombing attacks continued they would burn the Casbah to the ground by
80

releasing gasoline into that neighborhood and then put it on fire.

This essentially

meant that the French government would have to undertake drastic measures to
eradicate the FLN presence in Algiers, unless it wished the city to become a virtual war
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zone or for the Pied-Noirs to foment chaos in its streets. A curfew was quickly imposed
upon the inhabitants of the Casbah, and detailed lists were made of the Muslim
population. The Algerians were also held responsible for the presence of their family
members and neighbors,so that the French would be able to determine the location
81

and actions of virtually every inhabitant of the Casbah at any given time.

This

incredibly high level of intelligence organization left the paratroopers free to seek out
the FLN membership without having to conduct fruitless searches in that warren like
neighborhood. Massu also ordered that his men be ruthless:
To acquire credibility, the paratroopers had to be even more extreme than the FLN.
This kind of summary execution in the streets of Algiers would prove that the
82
government was fully determined to prevail and that they were its enforcers.
The quandary posed by the threat of an insurrection by the Pied-Noirs was perceived as
a direct challenge to the authority of the government. This prevented the employment
of anything less than the most brutally efficient strategies of destroying the local FLN
cells, strategies that could show nothing less than France's utter determination to win
the conflict. The use of torture by the military intelligence officers such as Paul
Aussaresses was condoned by the civilian authorities, primarily due to the dire threat
posed by the urban revolutionaries of the FLN. Many suspected FLN militants were not
only tortured, but also made to 'disappear' by the military itself. Not only was the
traditional justice system circumvented by such actions, but also the authority of the
courts was in effect suspended. For example, when the FLN commander in Algiers, LarbI
Ben M'Hidi was captured by the paratroopers, he was promptly hung by Aussaresses
81
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and Colonel Marcel Bigeard on a detention farm located outside the city's environs.

After a brutal nine month occupation of Algiers by Massu's parachutists, the Casbah was
84

declared pacified in late 1957.

A singular event in 1958 would drastically change the course of the FrenchAlgerian War:the return of Charles De Gaulle to power in May 1958. The events prior
to his return to power also formalized the division of the French citizenry into two
ideologically opposed camps:the people of metropolitan France who disapproved of
the war itself and an alliance between the French Army in Algeria and the Pied-Noirs.
On April 26^^, 1958, a series of demonstrations against the government was undertaken
85

by the European population in Algeria in the cities of Oran and Algiers,

This was

followed by a general strike on the 13*'' of May as well as the seizure of power by the
86

military leadership in Algiers on that same day.

This military junta was led by Generals

Raoul Salan and Jacques Massu who formed a new government known as the
Committee of Public Safety and demanded the return offormer General Charles De
87

Gaulle to the Presidency.

To the generals and their supporters, Charles De Gaulle

represented the best chance of achieving victory in Algeria. He was not a mere
politician, whose power was dependent on the cohesiveness and effectiveness of a
coalition government. Instead, Charles De Gaulle was the man who had been the face
of the Free French during the Second World War. Thus,the military and the Pied-Noirs
believed that De Gaulle would prosecute the war with extreme prejudice and not
83
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succumb to political opposition. The military leadership in Algeria was not satisfied with
controlling events there, it was beginning to implement plans for a coup against the
Fourth Republic's government in Paris, which was called 'Operation Resurrection' and
sought to overthrow the government and reinstate De Gaulle by force.®® The threat of a
coup 'd'etat was crucial to the dissolution of the ailing Fourth Republic and allow De
Gaulle to return to power on May 29^^ 1958.®® Though it was the fervent belief of the
military leadership and of the Pied-Noirs that only a government under De Gaulle would
seek to keep Algeria under French rule, this would prove not to be the case. The actual
consequences for the mutinous generals would be apparent In the early days of De
Gaulle's leadership of the Fifth Republic.
The restoration of Charles De Gaulle to power had two Immediate
consequences. The first was that France was now under the authority of a popular and I
powerful leader who would not tolerate any challenge to his authority by either the
military or the citizenry, whether they were in the Metropole or In Algeria. Alarmed at
the entrance of the military into the realm of politics, De Gaulle began to purge the
leadership in Algeria of those who sympathized with the European settlers.®® Generals
Salan and Edmond Jouhaud were transferred to other assignments by the end of 1958
91

and were replaced by Army officers loyal to De Gaulle.

The second consequence

would be De Gaulle's conclusions about the course of the war and what a victory would
mean to France. By 1958, it was seemingly apparent to all that the tide of war was
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firmly in favor of the French.

The defeat of the FLN insurgents would re-affirm the

existence of French Algeria, a province in which nine million Muslims outnumbered the
93

roughly one million Europeans.

But a province of France dominated by non-Europeans

was an anathema to De Gaulle, especially one that could potentially furnish 80 Muslim
Deputies to the National Assembly if the local Berber population was given equal voting
rights as by the terms of the constitution of the Fifth Republic.®^ De Gaulle believed that
Muslims, Asians and Africans could be French citizens, although it would only be
acceptable for them to exist only as a marginal group with little political sway.®^ A
politically powerful and substantial minority group, especially a Muslim one, could not
be allowed to exist in France,for in the opinion of De Gaulle,"France will no longer be
France. We are in any case above all a European people, racially white, culturally Greek
//96

and Latin, and religiously Christian.

The supposed savior of the Pied-Noirs and the

Army in fact did not share their opinions on the matter of a French Algeria and his
consequent actions would set Algeria ablaze.
Even though Charles De Gaulle was completely opposed to the complete social
and political incorporation of Algerian Muslims into France, his primary political goal of
altering the very structure of the French system of government had more important
ramifications In store for the situation in Algeria. Early In 1958, he had hinted his
intentions, as Alistair Horne wrote:"His price for returning, clearly implied, was the
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complete replacement of the system of the Fourth Republic.

De Gaulle had not

returned from his retirement to serve as the caretaker of the France, he instead sought
to stake his political legacy upon returning France to global political eminence. As he
himself stated.
I considered it necessary,for the government not to derive from parliament, in other
words from the parties, but, over and above them,from a leader directly mandated by
98
the nation as a whole and empowered to choose,to decide and to act.
He perceived the political impotence of the Third and Fourth Republics to be its reliance
on coalition governments, whose already tenuous hold on political power was further
99

undermined by the rapid rate of turnover of Its Prime Ministers and Cabinets.

Even

before his formal induction as President of France in January 1959, he had made
remarkable headway on this platform. Not only was his proposed Constitution for the
Fifth Republic approved, but in the November 1958 elections, his political opposition
suffered significant losses in the National Assembly;the Communists,for example saw
100

their number of deputies reduced from 145 to a mere ten.

Furthermore, many of his

internal economic reforms were passed, and he was making it unequivocally clear to
both the British and the United States that France would be their equal In the
101

governance of N.A.T.O. or its participation In the alliance would cease.

He also

believed that the French Army had been brought to heel,for all officers in Algeria had
been forced to terminate their membership In the Committee of Public Safety; also over
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1,500 officers had been transferred back to France or forcibly retired.

De Gaulle

believed that he had accrued substantial political capital and support to reach some sort
of lasting solution to the Algerian problem and would tolerate no dissension, especially
from those who sought to keep Algeria under French dominion.
On September 19,1958 a Gouvernement Provisoire de la Republique Algerienne
(GPRA) was proclaimed in Cairo; Ferhat Abbas was its first President, and among his Vice
103

Presidents were Ahmed Ben Bella and guerrilla chieftain Belkem Krim.

Ferhat Abbas

was the most prominent of the pre-war liberal politicians, and represented the interests
104

of the more secular and bourgeoisie Algerians.

Ahmed Ben Bella was a decorated

veteran of the Free French Army In World War II, but upon his return to Algeria, he
became disenchanted with the French discrimination towards the native Algerians,
whom he felt were treated as second-class citizens.^°^ Ben Bella became an
underground militant after an incident in which he shot a man during a dispute over his
father's land.106 This episode convinced Ahmed Ben Bella that the French colonial
authorities had been trying to eliminate him, and this served as a large portion of his
motivation to drive the French out of Algeria.

107

Belkem Krim was elected due to his

influence among the Berbers of the Kabylla Mountains; he had been waging a guerrilla
conflict against the French since 1947, and by 1954 had a partisan band numbering 500
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men.

This entity was quickly recognized by Tunisia, China, Pakistan, Morocco,Sudan,
109

Iraq, Ethiopia, Liberia and the United Arab Republic.

Though the conflict within

Algeria was still ongoing,the existence of the GPRA provided De Gaulle with a more
acceptable group to negotiate with than the FLN,Its legitimacy tied to the GPRA's not
being directly involved in the insurgency against France. The recognition of its existence
by other countries allowed the GPRA to begin to effectively function as a sovereign
government, and it began to employ ambassadors to press its case both before the
110

United Nations and in foreign capitals.

Though the GPRA was essentially an Algerian
111

government in exile, it was greatly hindered by internal factions within it.

Its

President, Ferhat Abbas spent the majority of his time mediating conflicts between the
112

other leaders of the government.

A lack of consensus however, was the least of the

GPRA's worries,for a more severe threat to its power existed: those Algerians actively
engaged In the war against the French.
Since the beginning of the French-Algerian War,the commanders of the FLN's
Wilayas had largely been conducting combat operations without direction from a higher
command authority. In essence,they had autonomy in their strategic operations and
decision making. Furthermore,they received less than consistent logistical support
from the Algerian nationalist leadership abroad, and thus often disregarded orders and
113

directives that they disagreed with.
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their commanders only, not the politicians abroad.

Meanwhile, Algerian military

leaders in both Tunisia and Morocco were attempting to create a coordinated command
115

structure that would direct all military operations.

They decided to create two senior

command posts, and each Commandant of Military Operations(COM)would have
116

authority over half of Algeria.

These posts were filled by Colonel Hour! Boumedienne
117

in Morocco and Mohammedi Said in Tunisia.

This re-organization took place during

1958 and 1959, which was a period in which the internal forces were under constant
118

French attack.

The lack of external support due to the effectiveness of the French

border defenses greatly angered the Wilaya commanders, whose enmity towards the
GPRA grew daily. They however, were too hard pressed by the French Army to be able
119

to mount any serious opposition to the GPRA.
the GPRA's tenuous grasp on authority.

120

Yet they were not the only threat to

After a disastrous attempt to both re-supply

the Wilayas and to break the Morice line in November 1958,several of the colonels in
121

the Tunisian portion of the FLN began to conspire against the GPRA.

Led by a Colonel

Lamouri,the four officers planned to attack the GPRA in Tunis, execute its leaders and
122

institute their own military regime.

The plot was discovered, however, and all its

123

participants were arrested.
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Boumedienne, who achieved notoriety for condemning all four conspirators to death.
After presiding over the court-martial of the four rebellious colonels, Hourl
Boumedienne assumed command of the Tunisian portion of the Army, and instituted
125

harsh disciplinary measures as well as re-organized its units.

Consequently,

Boumedienne began to serve as Chief of Staff of the entire Armee de Liberation
126

Nationals (ALN).

The rise of Boumedienne helped end both internal and external

Algerian opposition to the GPRA, which then enabled the Algerian independence
movement's governing body to concentrate on attempting to negotiate an end to the
127

war with the French government.

The nationalist Algerian leadership was now secure

in Its grasp of political power, and would face virtually no further opposition to its
authority.
Charles De Gaulle took the fateful first step towards concluding hostilities in
Algeria on September 16,1959, when he declared.
Thanks to the progress of pacification, of democracy and of social evolution, we can now
look forward to the day when the men and women who live in Algeria will be in a
position to decide on their destiny, once and for all, freely, in the full knowledge of what
is at stake. Taking Into account ail these factors,those of the Algerian situation,those
inherent in the national and international situation, I deem it necessary that recourse to
self-determination be here and now proclaimed. In the name of France and of the
republic, by virtue of the power granted to me by our constitution to consult Its citizens,
granted that God let me live and that the people lend me their ear, I commit myself to
ask, on the one hand, of the Algerians in their twelve departments, what it Is they finally
128
wish to be and, on the other hand, of all Frenchmen to endorse their choice.
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He then offered them three options: outright secession from France; complete and total
integration within France; or a federalized state within the French Union, which would
129

be a continued association with France with political autonomy.

This speech, along

with the options offered by De Gaulle, signaled that he was utterly determined to end
the conflict, even if it meant that France would leave Algeria. That initial negotiations
with the GPRA would not begin until the following June, and not make headway until
1961 was inconsequential at this point,for De Gaulle had made his decision and was
130

committed to finding a solution to the Algerian problem,

His return to politics and his

vision of a stronger France, both domestically and Internationally, would be abortive If
he did not resolve affairs In Algeria. With his reputation and historical legacy directly at
stake, nothing less than success in this area would be satisfactory.
At this point in the French-Algerian War,in the years 1960 until 1962, a different
sort of conflict exploded, one that would ultimately prove to be of more importance
than the continuance of combat operations against the forces of the ALN. What
erupted was civil strife. This period was marked by the existence of a de facto civil war
between the French who supported De Gaulle, and those who vehemently opposed an
exodus from Algeria. The opposition forces, comprised of the Army In Algeria and the
Pied-Noirs, had already signaled their willingness to defy French governmental
authority. Their formation of the Committee of Public Safety in 1958 had been the first
indication of their intentions, as this temporary government took Its name from the
ruling body during a phase of the French Revolution. Though the visceral and violent
129
130
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reaction of the Pied-Noirs could have easily been predicted,the question that begs
answering, is, why the army?
Numerous authors postulated that the roots of the French army's eventual
participation in both 1958, and the Generals' putsch of 1961 stemmed from the events
following the Fall of France in 1940. Alexander Harrison traced the politicization of the
Army to the officer class being forced to choose between the legal, albeit Nazi-allied
Vichy Regime of Marshal Retain, or to join the government in exile, headed by Charles
De Gaulle.131 Though these military leaders would fight against each other during the
North African portion of the Second World War,they were all united in the common
132

belief that the politicians had betrayed France.

But paramount among the officer
133

class was the notion that they had preserved their own honor,

Those who had sided

with Vichy believed that their actions had persevered France from total destruction, and
those who fought against the Nazis portrayed themselves as fighting with the Allies, and
134

not with the Free French.

Another factor in the Army's new interest in politics was

the infusion of men from the middle-class and former resistance fighters among the
135

ranks of the officers.

Prior to World War II, the officer class had been exclusively

composed of graduates of the military academy at Saint Cyr and of aristocrats, while
many of the new middle-class officers had risen from the ranks in the Free French and
136

had earned their commissions on WWII battlefields.

131
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Still retained the perspectives of civilian life, they had known more than merely life in
the military. The outcome of the war in Indochina, however, provided the impetus for
revolt in 1961,
For eight years the regulars of the Legion and the pride of St. Cyr slogged through
distant jungles and rice paddies against a people in arms. Over that period the
equivalent of two thirds of each year's graduating class was killed annually, with the
other third suffering wounds. But back home officers found not sympathy but
contempt. Parliament after parliament stipulated against the use of conscript troops in
the "dirty war."...Just before the very end there came,at Dienbienphu, a defeat to rank
with Waterloo and Sedan. And then Geneva,once more,opened the doors to the
excuse of political betrayal. Hundreds of junior officers, who had rallied Indochinese to
137
the French cause by personal pledges,felt their honor compromised by Paris.
It is Important to note that the events of 1940 and the Indochinese War were formative
only for the officers in regular army units, not the conscripts that would be eventually
deployed to Algeria. For these professional soldiers, the Algerian War was more than
138

just another conflict, it was a test of their personal honor and that of the Army.
While the French Army regulars developed a distinct political outlook as a result
of their experiences in both World War II and the French-Indochina War,their distinct
viewpoint was not compatible with those of the civilians of metropolitan France.
Additionally, even the
French Army conscripts In Algeria did not share their views. The Pied-Noirs, however.
shared the opinions and military viewpoint towards the conflict and its implications.
They too had a stake in the continuance of a French Algeria,for more than their honor
and reputation was at stake: their lives, property and existence were threatened almost
daily by the fighting. The commonalities of the Pied-Noirs and the Army regulars
137
138
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allowed them to forge a covert alliance dedicated to the preservation of Algeria as a
part of France.
A little known fact about the Pied-Noirs is that they had been active participants
in the Algerian War since the beginning. Their involvement Initially took the place of
139

vigilante actions in the city of Algiers.

These were reprisals for FLN attacks within the
140

city itself, and the Pied-Noirs were used as muscle by the local police.

Death Squads,

known as Deltas and partially comprised of off-duty policemen, would target both FLN
141

hideouts and suspected militants in the Casbah.

Paramilitary organizations, such as

the French North African Union (UFNA)and the Resistance Organization of North Africa
(ORAF) were set up by Pied-Noir extremists,took the Pied-NoIrs' participation even
further, exploding bombs In the Casbah in retaliatory actions as well as setting up their
142

own interrogation center in the environs of Algiers.

By abetting. If not subtly

encouraging the formation and participation of such groups,the French officials In
Algeria had unleashed a monster they could not control. Furthermore,these
paramilitaries were political radicals who embraced a seditious philosophy. Historian
Todd Shepard described this as follows:"By the early 1960's a late-blooming
metropolitan consensus embraced an argument that ever since has functioned as fact:
Algeria was not France but a colony, and thus it deserved and would obtain Its
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independence.

The Pied-Noir radicals saw themselves as defending the very
144

Republican principles of France itself.

Alistair Horne remarked upon this:

Harking back to an earlier period of French history, there is a curious parallel between
this and the arming of the National Guard In Paris to help defend the city during the
siege of 1870; the siege over, and the Prussians having withdrawn,the unruly National
Guard then turned and rent the hand that created it, setting up its own revolutionary
Commune de Paris.
The Communards, as the National Guard became known,set up their own government
and then fought the French military in the streets of Paris, fighting behind barricades
made of cobblestones. Like the Paris Commune,the Pied-Noirs of Algiers, saw In
145

themselves the very spirit of the French Revolution of 1789.

In essence, a parallel

state had evolved within Algiers, the dire implications of which would first be realized in
1960.
General Jacques Massu was relieved of his command on January 22,1960,
prompted by an interview in which he emphatically stated,"Myself, and the majority of
officers in a position of command will not execute unconditionally the orders of the
Head of State.//146 The news enraged the Pied-Noirs, who were extremely fond of
Massu, and prompted action by the French National Front(FNF), a Pied-Noir political
organization that also had its own shock troops; it was essentially the consolidation of
147

all previous paramilitary organizations.

Led by cafe owner Joseph "Big Joe" Ortiz and

the radical intellectual Jean-Jacques Susini,the FNF planned a general strike against the
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148

government on January 24, 1960.

No doubt inspired by what they perceived as their

victory against the Fourth Republic In May of 1958,Jean-Jacques Susini declared that.
''The hour to overturn the regime has struck. The revolution will start in Algiers and
move to Paris.//149 The first action of this attempted insurrection was the seizure of the
ISO

University of Algiers by ex-paratrooper and Pied-Noir Pierre Lagaillarde.

Meanwhile,

1,500 men of the F.N.F. under Big Joe Ortiz began constructing barricades in the center
151

of Algiers, a scene reminiscent of the Paris Commune.

When Gendarmes advanced

upon the barricades, shots suddenly rang out, and the following scene ensued:
Home-made bombs were dropped on the heads of gendarmes,and tyres stuffed with
plastique rolled out onto the boulevard and exploded. Caught at a terrible
disadvantage, the gendarmes fell like flies before they could load up and fire back.
Wounded men who crept Into buildings out of the line of fire were viciously attacked by
the F.N.F. within. There were horrible scenes as the catchword se payer un gendarme
(get yourself a cop) ran round, and maddened pied noir youths mercilessly dispatched
wounded gendarmes In cold blood. One was founded hanging by his feet In a stair well,
while a para colonel witnessing the scene declared that he had never before scene
wounded men so mercilessly machine-gunned as they crawled on the pavement. For
three quarters of an hour the massacre continued.
Civil war had essentially erupted in the streets of Algiers, and when the French Army
was deployed within the city, the battle lines would clearly be drawn. The first unit
deployed was the 1^' Parachute Regiment of the Foreign Legion, who Instead of quelling
the revolt, informed the F.N.F that they would not be fired upon and allowed supplies to
152

be brought to the insurrectionists.

The Commander of French Forces in Algeria,

General Maurice Challe, was also informed by no less than five generals and eleven
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Other senior officers that the army would not fire on the barricades.

This abortive

revolt was eventually quelled by a combination of two factors: bad weather and a
passionate speech by De Gaulle on January

De Gaulle's speech was nothing short

of incredible, harping upon the importance of French unity and issuing a challenge to
154

the honor of the Army.

The 25**^ Parachute Division was subsequently deployed in

Algiers and offered no sympathy to the F.N.F., refusingthefurther delivery of supplies
to the men behind the barricades; the lack of food, coupled with incessant rain, brought
155

an end to hostilities on January 31,1960.

n

Unfortunately,the "Week of Barricades

was only an indication of the violence that would occur.
The shock of the uprising in Algiers, coupled with the complicity of the Army,
made Charles De Gaulle more determined than ever to extricate France from Algeria, no
matter what the cost.156 He would not abide any challenge to the powers of the
Presidency, not matter what potential ramifications it could have for his political legacy.
The National Assembly concurred with their President, granting him additional
157

emergency powers over Algeria on February 2,1960.

The leadership of the Pied-

Noirs was essentially gutted by government persecution; Lagaillarde was Imprisoned for
158

a brief period, while Ortiz and many others sought political asylum in Spain.

The bulk

of the military leadership in Algeria was purged, replaced by devout Gaullist officers, or
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by those who known to be apolitical.

Initial negotiations with the GPRA began in late

June 1960, and by January of 1961,secret negotiations were taking place in
Switzerland.160 De Gaulle was also emboldened by a wave of anti-war protests in the
streets of Paris; it was clear enough to him that Algeria was a cancer in the side of
France, one that had to be expunged so his domestic political goals could be
consolidated.161 He would not allow the Fifth Republic to founder on the shoals of
Algeria or let his historical legacy sink along with his political vision for France.
One result of the fallout from the "Week of Barricades" was a covert alliance
between the Pied-Noir radicals and disgruntled military officers. Disgraced, and in selfimposed exile In Madrid, General Raoul Salan began to conspire with exiled radical
162

Pierre Lagiallarde about a possible coup in Algeria.

Not only would this potential coup

involve regular military units, but a newly created organization,the Organisation de
I'Armee Secrete (OAS), which was composed of Pied-Noirs and military deserters, would
163

also participate.

Salan would eventually assume leadership of this nascent extremist

group, however,the military leadership was also planning a coup during this period. By
late March 1961, retired Generals Maurice Challe, Edmond Jouhaud and Andre Zeller
164

had the initial plans of a coup in place.

The goal of this coup d'etat would be the

secession of Algeria from France,the complete and utter destruction of the FLN, after
which they would present De Gaulle with an ultimatum: resign or accept the permanent
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165

existence of a French Algeria.

On April 20,1961, Generals Challe and Zeller entered

Algeria clandestinely; two days later,the city of Algiers had been occupied, and the
166

governmental officials and Gaullist military high command had been imprisoned.

Almost immediately,the Generals' Putsch began to suffer setbacks. For example,only
two Foreign Legion Parachute Regiments,two regular Parachute Regiments and two
small detachments of Air Cavalry participated in this insurrection.^®’ The General's hope
that the rest of the French military in Algeria would follow their lead was never realized.
the Army in the cities of Constantine and Oran did not support them, nor did the Navy
or Air Force.168 Furthermore, it would be virtually impossible for Algeria to survive
economically: no more than twelve million in francs was located in the local branch of
the Banque de France, and imported foodstuffs and medical supplies would last no
more than three weeks.169 Also, the involvement of General Salan and his O.A.S. was
incredibly unpopular among the troops due to the fact that their political views were
even more extreme than those held by the majority of the soldiers.^’® Though the socalled General's Putsch seemed almost doomed from the start, the reaction in France
itself was extremely dramatic.
Surprise was the Initial reaction of De Gaulle and his Cabinet, and a sense of
foreboding permeated through the streets of Parls.^’^ Once the initial shock died down.
drastic action was undertaken in order to avert an overthrow of the government. A
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National State of Emergency was declared, and the right of habeas corpus was
immediately suspended/^^ Any Generals suspected of conspiring against De Gaulle
were arrested Immediately; this was crucial,for it rendered leaderless the 2,200
173

paratroopers who were to seize Paris.

The possibility of a coup was so palpable that.

Sunday, 23 April, Paris began to present an extraordinary spectacle under the warming
spring sunshine. Elderly Sherman tanks of Second World War vintage rumbled out from
retirement to take up positions outside the Assembly and other government buildings.
174
Discouragingly, some broke down and had to be towed across the Concorde.
All forms of transportation in and around Paris were shut down,and a sense of
175

trepidation was felt throughout the country.

Perhaps the most crucial action that

prevented a coup in the streets of Paris and forced the surrender ofthe revolting troops
was De Gaulle's radio address on the night of April 23,in which he essentially told the
military In Algeria and the people of France to choose between him and the rebellious
Generals.176 The medium of radio was especially critical during this crisis due to the fact
that many of the troops possessed transistor radios; in fact, both the mutineers and the
government broadcast propaganda pieces constantly.

The critical portion ofthe

speech was when Charles De Gaulle emphatically declared.
u

In the name of France, I order that every means, I say every means, be used to close
the road to these men until they are rushed. I forbid any Frenchman and,above all; any
178
soldier from carrying out any of their orders.
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The primary effect of his radio address was that the bulk of the Army in Algeria, who
were conscripts, never followed their officers into perdition. Among other reasons,
these conscripts resented the arrogance of the paratroopers, and De Gaulle's speech
179

gave them the confidence to disobey their superiors who joined the coup effort.
Furthermore, the conscripts had no motivation to join with the rebels,they were more
eager for an end to the fighting and their demobilization than to fight for the
preservation of a French Algeria. Devoid a personal stake in the conflict,the conscripts
were simply not willing to engage in treasonous activities against France for the sake of
the Pied-Noirs and the mutinous Army regulars. The reticence of the conscript to join
the revolt combined with President De Gaulle's powerful speech deprived the Generals'
of support: less than one hundredth of all French troops In Algeria were Involved in the
180

mutiny.

Having lost the "Battle of the Transistors", General Challe and his
181

compatriots ended their attempted coup d'etat on Tuesday April 25,1961.
The Army in Algiers was ruthlessly purged. The regiments that had participated
in the coup were disbanded, all of the officers who had actively participated were
imprisoned for long periods and several hundred officers and enlisted men received the
182

sentence of imprisonment as well.

Not only had this revolt of the Generals inexorably

stained the honor of the French Army, but their ability to operate effectively against the
ALN forces was severely curtailed. The Army had pushed France to the precipice of civil
war,for during the insurrection crisis of 1961, both the Communists and Trade Unionists
179
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had informed the Ministry of the Interior that they could muster thousands of
183

militiamen to fight against the military.

Though the coup had been a disaster,the

very idea that Frenchmen had almost gone to war with their countrymen in Algeria and
more importantly, in Metropolitan France, had the important side effect offorcing De
Gaulle to offer enormous concessions to the GPRA in order to begin serious peace
184

talks.

There Is simply no denying the importance of Charles De Gaulle's political goals.
the events of the Settler's Revolt In 1960 and the shocking General's Putsch of 1961 In
ending the involvement of France in Algeria. However,the very fact that the O.A.S.
started a general insurrection in the Algerian cities of Algiers and Oran; as well as
implementing a terrorism epidemic In France as well cannot be undervalued. The
extremists of the Secret Army Organization demonstrated a severity of purpose and a
ruthlessness that had not been evident in the Insurrections of 1960 and 1961. The
success of the previous Insurrections had hinged upon the capitulation of Fifth Republic
and, more importantly, Charles De Gaulle to the interests ofthe rebellious faction in the
army and the Pied-Noirs. When this failed, all resistance effectively crumbled. The
O.A.S. however did not attempt to negotiate with France; its only options were victory
or death. Their actions were more evocative of the Paris Commune of 1871 than the
"Week of Barricades" had been. In Algiers, In the Pied-Noir neighborhoods,the word of
the O.A.S. was law. The government in Paris was now the enemy,for what had started
with the formation of Pied-Noir militias and death squads now had evolved Into a full
183
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blown parallel state. The O.A.S. was officially led by the fugitive Generals Salan and
Jouhaud, who had not surrendered after the Generals' putsch ended in 1961. In an
ironic twist, the inspiration for the O.A.S.'s tactics was that ofthe FLN's urban guerrilla
forces.185 Death squad leader, and Foreign Legion deserter Roger Degueldre best
summed up their goals, declaring that,
We must do a Budapest! It's the only solution. The F.LN. Imposed itself by violence,
and thanks to that Its become an interlocuteur valabeforthe French government. Only
violence will make us heard at the present. The generals and colonels didn't want
it...They failed. That proves they were wrong. Now,one must strike. Blow for blow. 186
Unleash war on the authorities. Kill the traitors. It's the only solution remaining to us.
Financed by extorting money from Pied-Noirs and by bank robberies In both France and
Algeria, they instituted a campaign of assassination and bombing attacks on French
187

officials, Muslims and the Pied-Noirs who did not join their movement.

Official

188

operations began in May 1961 and would continue until June of 1962.
The O.A.S. was such a force of chaos within Algiers that a pro-Gaullist Pied-Noir
organization, the Mouvement pour la Communaute(MPC)recruited its own secret
force, known as Barbouzes,to fight the O.A.S. in the ways that the police and military
could not.189 Though the Barbouzes would be slaughtered to the man by the end of
190

January 1962,their efforts led to the capture of600 O.A.S. members.

The cities of

Algiers and Oran were under the O.A.S.'s reign of terror,
Algiers had become a dead city at night. There were no longer any public distractions,
and little social life. Cinemas were empty or closed down;cafes had become dispirited
185
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and iron-shuttered bunkers. Instead of lingering in them,or promenading in the leafy,
cool boulevards, people were driven by fear to hurry home and stay Indoors,for death
seemed to lurk at every street corner...Cities that had once enjoyed the flashy late-night
existence of an Alicante now became East-Berlins-but East Berlins ruled by the mores of
191
Chicago of the "Roaring Twenties".
The O.A.S. was also active in Metropolitan France, carrying out a series of bombing
192

attacks, including one that attempted to kill Jean-Paul Sarte.

Its actions in France only

halted when a four year old girl, Delphine Renard, was brutally maimed in a bombing
attack.193 The O.A.S. would be destroyed by two major events:the capture of its leaders
Salan, Jouhaud and Degueldre in April of 1962, and its official truce with the FLN on June
194

17*^ as it became apparent that their cause was lost.

The O.A.S. did, however.

achieve one actual day of the civil war that it desired to wage. On April 23,1962,the
massacre of two truckloads of conscripts led to.
At first gendarmerie armoured cars raked the facades of apartment buildings with heavy
.50 calibre machine guns. But the O.A.S. marksmen fired back. Then,In the afternoon,
20,000 French troops moved in and sealed off Bab-el-Oued with its some 60,000
inhabitants. Tanks fired their cannon at point-blank range into suspected O.A.S. snipers'
nests. In the evening a flight of T.6. planes flew in to strafe the still rebellious quarter
with rockets and machine guns. It was a scene more familiar to an army coup In Bolivia
195
than anything ever experienced on French territory.
It was in such a disturbing occurrence that the callousness and fanaticism of the O.A.S.
was revealed. Frenchmen had mercilessly killed Frenchmen, all in the desperate hope
that their civil insurrection would create such a conundrum that the government in Paris
would be forced to its knees.
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The high probability that the armed forces of France would have
eventually quelled the resistance of the Algerian nationalists was essentially irrelevant
after the events of 1958. The misguided belief of the French Army and of the Pied-Noirs
that Charles De Gaulle would be the savior of French Algeria instead lead to the direct
opposite. De Gaulle returned to power not for that cause, but to pursue the political
agenda that he had been unable to implement following World War II. The creation of a
Presidential Republic in France,the dismantling of coalition rule, and the return of
France to international political preeminence was not only his vision, it was directly
linked with what he desired his historical legacy to be. His prescient thinking that even
if the Algerians would cease their quest for independence, France itself would have to
change in a dramatic fashion. From his perspective, preserving the traditional ethnic
and cultural identity of France was far more important than keeping that North African
colony under French suzerainty. It is ironic that in their determination to preserve the
existence of a French Algeria, the Pied-Noirs and the army sowed the seeds of their own
defeat. In the midst of his efforts to enlarge the political power ofthe French
presidency, De Gaulle was forced to confront two insurrections that essentially forced
him to follow the course of action that would lead to Algerian independence. Any
acquiescing to either the Army or the Pied-Noirs would be an act of appeasement,the
only result of which would be the negation of all he sought to achieve when he returned
to the helm of France in 1958. The honor of Charles De Gaulle, and of his Fifth Republic
was at stake, any effort to create a revolutionary government was a potential death
knell to his government,just as the Franco-Prussian War of 1870 and the revolt of the
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Paris Commune had ended that of the Third Republic. Pushed to the brink of civil war
by the Settler's Revolt of I960,the Generals' Putsch of 1961, and by the attempted
formation of the O.A.S.'s parallel state, Charles De Gaulle chose the most prudent action
he could: remove from the nation of France the cancer that troubled it, the continued
existence of French Algeria. The negotiation process was excruciatingly long, lasting off
196

and on from May 20, 1961 until its conclusion on March 18,1962.

The French

citizenry approved the referendum on Algerian independence in June 1962 and the
197

Algerians did the same on July 1^^ 1962.

On July 3,1962, President De Gaulle
198

officially recognized the existence of an independent Algerian state.

The primary beneficiary of the internecine conflict among the French was the
FLN. Had the French-Algerian War persisted,the Algerians would have been defeated
decisively by the French. Though pockets of resistance would still exist in the remote
crags and valleys of the Aures and Kabylia Mountain ranges, as well as in Tunisia and
Morocco,the FLN would have still lacked the ability to once again mount a massive
insurrection. It would also be highly likely that the GPRA and FLN would dissolve as
internal tensions between its leaders would come to forefront. Yet due to the firm
resolve of Charles De Gaulle to create a French government in his own image and his
unwillingness to continue a war that resulted in a virtual state of civil war between the
French in Algeria, there needed to be an end to the conflict for his goals to be realized.

196

Horne, A Savage War ofPeace, 467-522.
Horne, A Savage War ofPeace, 530-531.
198
Horne, A Savage War ofPeace, 531.

197

95

The tenacity and utter will to achieve victory of the FLN resulted in the fruition oftheir
ultimate desire: political power following independence.
Though the FLN possessed an incredible drive to achieve its goals, it was not an
organization prepared to share any power it would receive upon the departure ofthe
French from Algeria. The Front de Liberation Nationale had been created and organized
in its infancy by men who were disgusted by the inability of the native Algerian
politicians to exact political concessions and rights from the French colonial authorities.
Furthermore,the founders of the FLN had been disgusted by the politicians inclination
to fight among themselves than to work in concert in a cohesive Algerian political bloc.
It was instead a movement dedicated to achieving its aims by force, not by dialogue
alone. As described by historian Charles Shrader,
The FLN had all the characteristics of a political party (structure, discipline, and a
program) except one: a coherent doctrine. In fact,the FLN combined in one entity the
attributes and functions of a political party, national government and an army. While Its
organizational structure changed frequently to meet new situations and requirements,
the FLN's objectives remained constant:to assimilate or destroy all other Algerian
political parties; to gain the support of the Algerian Moslem population in order to
obtain funds, supplies and men for the rebellion; to drive out the French; and to achieve
199
the independence of a Moslem Algeria free of external control.
The FLN was particularly zealous in its efforts to exterminate any Internal opposition to
its tenuous political control over the Algerian people. Any instance of opposition was
dealt with both harshly and ruthlessly. Even though the Parti Communiste Aigerien
(PCA) was dominated by Europeans,the efforts of Its Algerian members to join the
conflict were quickly quashed by the FLN.^°° When Communists tried to set up their
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own guerrilla bands known as the maquis rouge in the summer of 1956,their militants
had been largely rounded up by the French by September

According to Alistair

Horne and others, this was due to the FLN's betrayal ofthe Communist guerrillas by
informing upon their actions and whereabouts to the French.^“ Those PCA militants
not captured by the French were forcibly integrated into the FLN and many of its leaders
203

chose exile in Moscow in lieu of subordinating themselves to the FLN leadership.

Though the PCA was easily destroyed, it did not pose as much as a threat to the FLN as
did the MNA. The MNA was a more severe threat to the FLN because its status as an
Islamic political party rather than a secular one detracted from the appeal of the FLN to
the Algerian masses. Furthermore,the existence ofthe MNA in metropolitan France as
well was a threat to the FLN's ability to raise funds for the war effort among the Algerian
immigrant population there. Even though the MNA at its zenith in 1959 had only 500
men and fifteen crew-served weapons; it was a threat primarily due to its claim to be a
movement guided by Islamic principles, which potentially had more appeal to the
followers of Muhammad than an organization more secular in nature. But rather than
incorporate the MNA and its appeal to the faithful into the FLN,the leaders ofthe FLN
choose to exterminate their rivals In lieu of collaboration.
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The experiences of both the Vietnamese Communists and the Front de Liberation
Nationale differed immensely during their individual struggles to throw off the yoke of
the colonial oppressor and to achieve independence. Prior to the onset ofthe Second
World War, the Vietnamese were deprived by the French colonial government of being
able to participate in politics. Not only did the French Surete seek to eradicate any
vestige of nationalism or anti-colonial dissent, but strict censorship laws prohibited the
proliferation of political literature. In contrast,the Algerians were granted minimal
political rights. Though Algeria was represented In the French National Assembly In
Paris, its Muslim inhabitants were the subject of both political and racial discrimination.
The Algerians were not deprived, as the Vietnamese were,of being able to form political
associations that could partake in governance. Thus, during the French-Algerian War,
the internal divisions among the Algerians opposed to the French were primarily based
on pre-war political rivalries, while in Indochina only a minority had been active In
politics prior to the onset of hostilities.
The manner in which each of the wars was conducted was vastly different as
well. In Vietnam,the climate, especially during Monsoon season, prevented year round
combat operations from being conducted. The Algerian war was fought in the relatively
temperate Mediterranean climate, so lulls in combat did not occur due to inhospitable
climatic conditions. The issue of international borders presented another area of
contrast, for the Vietnamese forces were able to use them to their advantage, while It
proved to be detrimental to the efforts of the Algerians. The Viet Mlnh were able to
create military sanctuaries in Laos and In the People's Republic of China that were
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virtually immune from French attack, even though the French were allied with the
Laotian government. Once the Vietnamese crossed into China,the French were
rendered impotent. \A/hile the French were unable to attack the FLN forces in both
Morocco and Tunisia, they were able to isolate them from their fellow guerrillas within
Algeria. The construction of fortified lines along the Tunisian border prevented the FLN
from being able to reinforce or supply their comrades in the country without incurring
grievous casualties in the attempt. On the other hand, however,the French Algerian
War occurred directly after the French-Indochina War,so the French had the advantage
of knowing how to effectively neutralize guerrilla forces, a lesson which they had paid
for in blood in the deltas, highlands and jungles of Indochina. The issue of outside
assistance was also different. The Viet Minh were aided by the People's Republic of
China during their war of independence;they were given military sanctuaries in China,
weapons, monetary assistance and military advisers. While the FLN was allotted similar
sanctuaries in both Tunisia and Morocco,they lacked a significant military benefactor.
In addition, the Viet Minh were extremely well organized and were able to wield both
regular and irregular detachments to great effect. The trained Algerian forces were not
able to fight inside their country due to the French sealing of Algeria's borders with
Tunisia and Morocco. Instead, they relied upon urban guerrilla cells in the Algerian
cities and upon irregular bands of maquis In the Aures and Kabylia Mountain Ranges.
Thus,the Viet Minh were able to gain their independence by defeating the French In
battle, while the Algerians only gained theirs via negotiation.
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The manner in which the French prosecuted their colonial wars differed as well.
In Indochina they lacked the manpower needed to obtain a numerical superiority over
the Vietnamese, and their equipment was outdated, if not obsolete. It took a
tremendous amount of American military aid for the French to obtain modern aircraft,
yet they still lacked the amount necessary to be able to effectively re-supply besieged
units, such as the garrison at DIen Bien Phu. The French also had to contend with the
fact that there was no real clear front or area of combat operations in Indochina.
Fighting could feasibly occur anywhere In Vietnam, moreover the French were also
hindered by the lack of secure Interior lines and communications. In contrast,the
fighting in Algeria was largely confined to the hinterland and In the major cities. There,
the French were able to wield superior numbers and equipment to that of their
opponents. Even the issue of natives allied to the French was different. The tribal levies
and Vietnamese troops allied with the French in Indochina proved to be of dubious
quality and their loyalty was often suspect. In Algeria, the loyalist Muslims, or harkis,
were reputed to be reliable and tenacious soldiers. In Vietnam,the French were not
encumbered by the need to defend French citizens from Viet Minh attacks, while in
Algeria the French settlers located outside of the urban areas lived under the constant
threat of being attacked by Algerian guerrillas. The will of the French to defeat the
insurgent movements was another area in which differences were apparent. By the end
of the French-1 ndochina-War,the French political authorities had tired of the prolonged
conflict, despite the fact that the majority of their expenditures were subsidized by
American aid. The French-Algerian War did not feature an utterly war weary France.
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Instead, the French had practically achieved victory over the FLN, yet the political
ramifications of incorporating Algeria into France, and with it, a large number of
Muslims, did not sit well with President Charles De Gaulle and his rigid conception ofthe
French identity. Furthermore, in Algeria,the French government had to deal with an
Insurgency of its own citizens, who opposed not only the colonial administration but the
French government in Paris as well.
Though the experiences of the FLN and Vietnamese Communists differed during
hostilities, both entities shared a similar approach in dealing with their political rivals.
Their manner of eliminating the opposition was not an issue of ideology, but rather
stemmed from the desire to be the dominant force in the independence movement. In
essence,the force that overthrew the French would then have a legitimate claim on
post-colonial political sovereignty. Thus,tolerating a rival claimant to power was
unthinkable to both the Vietnamese and Algerians. The Vietnamese Communists
adopted a more conciliatory approach, utilizing the VIetminh in order to rally
Vietnamese nationalists to the cause of independence, and were careful to keep
Communist rhetoric or practices subdued. When Ho Chi Minh declared the creation of
an independent Vietnam in 1945, he and his fellow Communists were more than willing
to collaborate with political opponents initially. Later however,the Vietnamese
Communists moved decisively to eliminate their opponents, assassinating those In
Saigon in 1945 and eradicating the VNQDD as a political entity in Hanoi in 1946. After
the conclusion of the French-Indochina War in 1954, Ho Chi Minh and the government
of the Peoples Republic of Vietnam were careful not to get involved in trying to
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overthrow their rival Republic of Vietnam. Instead,they waited until internal opposition
to the Diem government arose to begin their efforts to overthrow the Saigonese
government. The Algerians, on the other hand, did not seek to create a broad
nationalist movement that included members of various political parties. Instead,they
sought to dominate the Algerian independence movement. When the Port/
Communiste Algerien attempted to create its own guerrilla units,they were informed on
by the FLN, who used the French to eliminate their political opponents. When the MNA
also sought to get involved In the war against the French,the FLN brutally exterminated
their political rivals. This conflict extended beyond Algeria itself into France, where
violence erupted in 1956-1957 between the supporters of the FLN and MNA within the
Algerian immigrant community. When a MNA unit was discovered,such as the one at
Melouza,they were ruthlessly slaughtered. Though the Vietnamese Communists were
ideologically motivated to eliminate their political opponents,the impetus behind the
actions of the FLN was different. Ben Bella and the other militants who had founded the
FLN were disgusted with the inability of Algerian politicians to exact concessions from
the French and by rampant political infighting between the Algerian political parties.
The FLN's founders wanted to wrest their independence from the French, and wanted
post-war political power. It was detrimental to their ambitions then,to allow other
independence movements to exist, since those would compete with them for funds and
influence among the native Algerians. Thus,the strategy they employed was simple:
join the FLN or die. Neither the Vietnamese nor the Algerians had any democratic
ambitions for their countries post-independence. Instead,they sought to eliminate any
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semblance of internal opposition in the hope that once independence was achieved.
their goal of political hegemony in their homeland could easily be attained.
In conclusion, the historical chronicle of France's 20^’’ Century colonial conflicts in
Indochina and Algeria predominantly focuses on the course of the war and the manner
in which it was fought. Though more historians and writers choose to focus on
examining the conflict itself, there is equally relevant information to be gleaned from
the history of the independence movements themselves. This is especially true for
Algeria, for the conflict between those wishing a more secular government and those
who support Islamic based rule continued after independence and even resulted in the
outbreak of civil war in the early 1990s. As for Vietnam,the trials and tribulations
caused by the period of nearly constant war from 1946 until 1975 had a profound effect
on both its political culture and economic practices. It Is imperative to study the roots
of how each group assumed the role of government following the departure of the
French in order to better grasp the development of both the Vietnamese and Algerian
states. In essence, the knowledge of how the struggle for power that took place
concurrently with the colonial conflict is important for the understanding of the modern
countries which exist today. The utilization of such an approach does not only pay
dividends for the study of Algeria and Vietnam, but also for the examination of other
African and Asian states that waged their own wars of Independence.
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